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Securities Law Responsibilities of Issuers to Respond




A common and recurring problem facing corporate manage-
ment and counsel is whether some action should be taken to correct
or respond to inaccurate publicly disseminated information concern-
ing the corporation. Because their greater size and number of secur-
ity holders result in more widespread public interest, this concern is
encountered more frequently by publicly held corporations; but even
smaller enterprises are not immune.
The problem can arise in several ways.' A security analyst or
brokerage firm may report results of its research in a "market letter"
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law; B.A.,
Randolph-Macon College, 1968; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1971.
1 The examples given do not exhaust the possible ways in which inaccurate information
regarding the issuer may become publicly disseminated. Two others which readily come to
mind are when the issuer itself makes an error in a registration statement, prospectus or other
statutorily mandated disclosure, or when the issuer releases incorrect information in some
other fashion, such as a press release. The issuer's duty to avoid making such affirmative
misrepresentations is well established. If not expressly prohibited by a disclosure statute, see
15 U.S.C. §§ 77(k), 770), 78(r) (1976), the misrepresentation will be prohibited by the general
anti-fraud provisions. The most prominent anti-fraud provisions in the federal securities laws
are sections 10b of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(1976)) and rule 10b-5 promulgated there-
under by the Securities Exchange Commission (17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1982)), section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act (15 U.S.C. § 77(q)(1976)), and section 14(e) of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(e)(1976), limited to fraud in a tender offer).
Even when no trade is contemplated, any false or misleading statement by the issuer
made in a manner reasonably contemplated to affect the market is a violation. See, e.g., SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In
this type of situation, there may also be an issue of whether the issuer is obligated to correct
the misinformation which it disseminated. See Butler Aviation Int'l., Inc. v. Comprehensive
Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842, 843 (2d Cir. 1970). If the original misstatement was merely
negligent, the subsequent failure to correct with knowledge of the inaccuracy could supply
the necessary scienter which was originally missing. Allen, The Disclosure Obligaion of Public'y
Held Coroorations in the Absence of nsider Trading, 25 MERCER L. REV. 479, 494 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Allen]. This article is not addressed to these issues. It is also not addressed to the
related question of whether the issuer has a duty to correct its own earlier statements which,
although accurate when made, are rendered inaccurate or misleading by subsequent events.
See, e.g., Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y.), re'don other grounds, 607 F.2d
545 (2d Cir. 1979); SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 297 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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which misstates facts concerning the issuer or in which the conclu-
sions drawn by the analyst are unsupported by the facts.2 Similarly,
a news report based on interviews with management or other investi-
gation by the reporter may inaccurately state facts or draw inaccu-
rate conclusions. 3 More frustrating to management is the misquoting
or misreporting by the news media of a. carefully drafted press re-
lease. 4 Perhaps the most difficult situation, from the standpoint of
management, is when incorrect rumors circulate.5
Each of these examples presents a common problem: Do the
federal securities laws' disclosure requirements require a correcting
response from the issuer? This article considers that question and
provides a framework for use by management in deciding whether to
speak up.
The article will address three major issues. First, an investiga-
tion of an issuer's obligation to respond to rumors or publicity must
start with consideration of whether the issuer is obligated to disclose
all material information, even in the absence of publicity or trading.
If so, a duty to respond to rumors would clearly be included. Al-
though some have argued for such an expanded duty, reason compels
its rejection. Second, the only duty which has yet been imposed on
an issuer facing inaccurate rumors or publicity concerning its affairs
is the responsibility to respond if such information is "attributable"
to the issuer. The few decisions in this area have failed to develop the
attribution concept so that it might be applied consistently to the
myriad settings in which rumors and publicity originate and are dis-
seminated. To fill that gap, the third part of this article proposes a
fault analysis for determining attribution. Under that analysis,
whether the information is attributable to the issuer will depend
upon the issuer's responsibility or fault for the initiation or publica-
tion of the misleading information. The article concludes that the
mere presence of rumors or publicly circulating inaccuracies concern-
ing the issuer does not, by itself, require a response from the issuer.
2 Ste Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Intercontinental-
Indus. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972);
Green v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ore. 1973).
3 See Electronic Specialty. Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969); Hutto v. Texas Income Prop., Inc., 416 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Milberg v.
Western Pacific R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp.
753 (D.N.J. 1955).
4 See Zucker v. Sable, 426 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
5 See State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) and 404
U.S. 1005 (1971). In each of those cases the rumors turned out to be well founded.
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But, such a response may become necessary when the issuer is the
source of the inaccuracy or is responsible for its dissemination.
II. Background
A. Materialipy
Materiality is an element of virtually all the disclosure require-
ments of the federal securities laws.6 Thus, no discussion of disclosure
obligations and liability for non-disclosure or faulty disclosure is
complete without reference to the materiality of the fact omitted or
misstated. Without a materiality requirement, disclosure would be-
come largely useless. The issuer would be forced to include all facts,
immaterial as well as material, and it would become impossible for
investors to separate the latter from the former. This discussion will
be based on the assumption that materiality is not at issue. Clearly,
if the fact which is the subject of the inaccurate rumor or news article
is not material, 7 the failure of the issuer to respond will not constitute
a violation. Any duty to respond to publicly circulating information
is limited to material facts.8
B. Exchange and NASD Requirements
The question of whether to respond to rumors and other pub-
licly circulated inaccuracies is readily-answered for any issuer whose
securities are listed on either the New York or American Stock Ex-
6 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12(2), 17(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77k, 77/, 7 7q (1976);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976); SEC rule 10b-5(2), 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
7 The Supreme Court of the United States has most recently defined materiality as
follows:
An omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote. . . . Put another
way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
the total mix of information made available.
TSC Indus. v. Northway Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Although the issue there was the
materiality of a fact omitted from a proxy statement allegedly in violation of SEC rule 14a-9,
it is generally assumed that this definition would apply under the anti-fraud provisions as
well. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 187 (3rd Cir. 1981); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981)..
8 The effect of a rumor or news report on the materiality of the fact at issue presents a
special problem. An otherwise immaterial fact may become material because of the public-
ity. An example is when the issuer plans no stock split but a false report circulates that a 2 for
1 split is imminent. Although the absence of a plan to split the stock is clearly not material
prior to the report, it may well be afterward. See Hewitt, Developing Concepts of Mateialit and
Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAw. 887, 898 (1977), where the author indicates that changes of the con-
text in which the question of materiality is raised may affect the determination of whether a
particular fact is material.
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change, or on the National Association of Securities Dealers Auto-
mated Quotation System (NASDAQ). The two exchanges have
adopted full affirmative disclosure requirements, commonly referred
to as "timely disclosure policies." 9 These policies are premised on the
assumption that an orderly and efficient securities market can be
achieved only if all participants share equal access to material
information.
The rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) require the
issuer to release promptly and fully any information "which might
reasonably be expected to materially affect the market" for its securi-
ties. 10 The rules recognize that, at times, public release of material
information may be premature or that the issuer may have legitimate
business reasons for temporarily withholding material information
from the public. In such event, the rules will permit secreting the
information only so long as it truly remains confidential. As soon as
the information is disclosed to other than senior management, or if
there is any indication that the information has leaked, the rules
mandate immediate public release.' Consistent with this require-
ment, the rules specifically require a prompt "frank and explicit" re-
sponse to rumors. 12  If the rumors are correct, an explanatory
confirmation is necessary; if the rumors are false or inaccurate, a de-
nial or clarification is in order; and, if the issuer knows of no corpo-
rate development to account for the unusual market activity, a
statement to that effect must be issued.' 3 Issuer response is required
regardless of the source of the rumors' 4 or the possible business incon-
9 Talesnick, Corporate Silence and Rule lob-5.- Does a Publicy Held Corporation Have an 4flan-
ative Obligation To Disclose?, 49 DENVER L.J. 369, 376 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Talesnick];
"Disclosure to Investors, A Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies Under the '33 and
'34 Acts," at 329 [hereinafter cited as the Wheat Report]; Shade, Duties of Publicly Held Corpo-
rations Under the Federal Securities Laws, 26 Bus. LAw. 497, 505 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Shade]; West, Timey Disclosure-The View From I.1 Wall Street, 3 SEC. L. REV. 155, 156 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as West].
10 NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL, A-18, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
23,121 (Feb. 11, 1981) [hereinafter cited as NYSE MANUAL].
11 NYSE MANUAL, supra note 10, at A-19.
12 Id at A-23.
13 Id In defending its initial press release concerning the now famous Timmons, Ontario
ore find, Texas Gulf Sulphur contended that the need for a quick response to a rumor would
excuse its failure to set forth all the facts in detail. The apparent basis for this position was
that assimilation of the facts and drafting of such a release would unduly delay the response,
thereby permitting the rumor a longer opportunity to do its damage. The argument did not
prevail. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 100 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
14 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD 138.469
(1979) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG & LOWENFELS].
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venience to the issuer.15
The timely disclosure policy of the American Stock Exchange
(AMEX) is very similar to that of the NYSE. Its basic requirement is
that the issuer must make an immediate public announcement of all
material1 6 information except in certain "exceptional" circum-
stances, such as when immediate disclosure would prejudice corpo-
rate objectives, or when the situation is a fluid one and a more
appropriate time for disclosure is imminent.1 7 Withholding material
information under those circumstances is permissible only so long as
confidentiality is maintained. If rumors or reports are circulating
publicly, 8 a response is necessary even if the source cannot be traced
back to the issuer.19
A shorter and less flexible disclosure rule has been adopted by
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) affecting se-
curities quoted on NASDAQ. It provides that the issuer must
promptly disclose to the public "any material information which
may affect the value of its securities or influence investors' deci-
sions."'20 Unlike the policies of the exchanges, the issuer has no dis-
cretion to withhold disclosure temporarily for legitimate business
reasons or while the facts may be in a state of flux. 2 1 In addition, the
provision includes a requirement to respond promptly to publicly
disseminated but inaccurate rumors, news reports or market letters.
It is clear that each of these self-regulating agencies has adopted
15 NYSE MANUAL, supra note 10, at A-23.
16 For this purpose the American Stock Exchange has adopted its own definition of
materiality:
(a) where the information is likely to have a significant effect on the price of any of
the company's securities; or (b) where such information (after any necessary inter-
pretation by securities analysts or other experts) is likely to be considered impor-
tant, by a reasonable investor, in determining his choice of action.
AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 23,124 [here-
inafter cited as ASE GUIDE].
17 Id at 9j 402, 403(1).
18 Id at 403(1). The Guide specifies that if the rumor or report is correct it should be
publicly confirmed by the issuer. If it is incorrect it should be denied, and if it is misleading
the issuer's response should set forth sufficient facts to clarify it. Id at 403(3). With respect
to erroneous earnings project ions, however, ordinarily no response from the issuer is necessary
unless the projection is clearly erroneous, manifestly based on erroneous information or is
wrongly attributed to the issuer. Id
19 Id at 403(1); Intercontinental Indus. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 940
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972); 2 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, sufira note 14,
at 138.469.
20 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS MANUAL, Schedule D, Part II,
§ (B)(3)(b) [hereinafter cited as NASD MANUAL].
21 3 A. H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 9.09[3], at 9-
35 [Rev. 1980] [hereinafter cited as BLOOMENTHAL].
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a full disclosure policy which not only includes the duty to respond to
rumors and other publicly circulating information, but also imposes
a duty, subject to few exceptions, to disclose all material information,
even in the absence of rumors or leaks. 22 Thus, for any issuer whose
securities are listed on either of the major exchanges or are author-
ized for quotation on NASDAQ the duty of disclosure is clear. Ru-
mors and other publicity must be answered if investors would
otherwise be misled or left at an informational disadvantage.2 3 But
the number of such issuers comprises only a small fraction of publicly
held companies. 24 For the many others, the timely disclosure policies
of the two exchanges and the NASD do not provide an answer to the
question of whether to respond to rumors.
25
III. An Affirmative Duty to Disclose?
For those issuers whose securities are not listed on an exchange
or authorized for quotation on NASDAQ the same duty would exist
22 The timely disclosure policies of both the exchanges have been summarized as, "when
in doubt, disclose." West, supra note 9, at 156; ASE GUIDE, supra note 16, at 23,124B.
23 The disclosure policies have been viewed as effective tools for prompting a steady
stream of information from issuers subject to them. REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURI-
TIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., Part III, at 92 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES
MARKETS] (referring specifically to the timely disclosure policy of the New York Stock Ex-
change). The effectiveness of these policies is no doubt dependent upon an active "stock
watch" program whereby the exchanges monitor unusual activity in listed securities to detect
rumors, publicity and insider trading. West, supra note 9, at 155. If an issuer fails to make a
public announcement following an inquiry from the stock watch program or violates the
timely disclosure policy in some other way, trading in the security may be temporarily halted
or the security might even be delisted. Intercontinental Indus. v. American Stock Exch., 452
F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d 2-1, 2-2 (1981);
NASD MANUAL, supra note 20, at § 1653A. Although one commentator has suggested that
an issuer could avoid making an unwanted disclosure by simply delisting its securities, that
seems to be an unrealistic solution for most issuers, which would not so easily forfeit listing.
Talesnick, supra note 9, at 379.
Another potential incentive for the issuer to comply with the applicable timely disclosure
policy results from the possibility of civil liability. Whether a private cause of action might be
implied for violation of exchange or NASD rules is not settled. Compare Jablon v. Dean Wit-
ter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980), with Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373 (2d
Cir. 1975). In view of the Supreme Court's reluctance to imply private causes of action under
the securities laws, see, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11
(1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), it seems unlikely that implied
liabilities for breach of these timely disclosure policies will now be created or will survive.
24 Bauman, Rule lob-5 and the Corporations Airmative Dut, To Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935,
937 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Bauman].
25 One authority has suggested that even corporations without such listed or authorized
securities may use the timely disclosure policies as a guide. Shade, supra note 9, at 505. That
is not necessarily a practical suggestion, however, for a corporation which would rather with-
hold comment on a rumor or report.
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if the federal securities laws imposed a duty to disclose similar to that
embodied in the timely disclosure policies of the exchanges and
NASD. If an issuer had an affirmative duty to disclose all material
information, it wodld have a duty to respond to rumors concerning
material facts. The latter duty would be encompassed within the for-
mer and would provide an easy answer to the present inquiry. How-
ever, despite the continuing debate about whether an affirmative
disclosure obligation exists, a careful reading of the relevant statutory
provisions reveals no such duty and it is highly unlikely that such a
duty would now be implied by the courts.
Both the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) require disclosure of
specifically itemized information. They do not include a require-
ment that the issuer disclose everything that is material.26 Thus, the
mandated disclosures of the federal securities laws do not duplicate
the full disclosure policies of the exchanges and NASD.27 The Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC) apparently possesses the au-
thority to go beyond statutorily mandated disclosure by
promulgating rules requiring additional disclosures, perhaps even
disclosures of all material information,28 but it has chosen not to do
so.29 After giving it some consideration, the SEC decided not to rec-
26 Schneider, Nits, Grts and Soft Information in SEC Filings, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 254, 270-71
(1972). See, for example, Schedule A to the Securities Act of 1933 setting forth what must be
included in a 1933 Act Registration Statement (15 U.S.C. § 77aa); Form 10 and instructions
thereto dealing with the required contents of a 1934 Act Registration Statement; and Form
10-K and instructions thereto for the annual report of a 1934 Act Registered Issuer.
The current report ofsignificant developments required of all 1934 Act registered issuers,
labelled the "8-K", comes the closest to requiring full disclosure, but even it only requires
disclosure of specifically itemized events and developments, while permitting but not requir-
ing disclosure of other material facts. Of course, when an issuer files a mandated disclosure,
such as a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933, in contemplation of entering
the market, full disclosure of all material facts must then be made. This result is not only
because the mandated disclosures require it, but also because the anti-fraud and civil liability
provisions prohibit trading by the issuer in the absence of full disclosure. Securities Act of
1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77/(2) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1976); SEC rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
27 Wheat Report, supra note 9, at 39, 331. In the same vein, the Commission has noted
that "informal corporate publicity is an important supplement to the disclosures required by
the securities acts" (emphasis added). SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, supra note
23, at 65.
28 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 12(a), 12 (G)(1), 13(a), & 15(d) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78L(a)(1), 78L (g) (1), 78m(a), 78(o)(d) (1976)); Blackstone, A Roadmapfor Disclosure
vs. A Blueprintfor Fraud, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 74, 84-85 (1978); Posner, Developments in Federal
Securities Regulation, 26 Bus. LAw. 1677, 1709-10 (1971); Comment, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 795,
812 [hereinafter cited as Comment on Disclosure].
29 Posner, supra note 28, at 1709-10. SEC.Commissioner Friedman recently proposed,
however, a modification of the structure of mandated disclosure for larger issuers about which
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ommend a comprehensive federal statute or rule pertaining to corpo-
rate publicity, despite the presence of myriad abuses:
The volume of corporate publicity [presently circulating], the para-
mount aim of full and prompt disclosure, the difficulty of making
judgments among specific items of publicity, and the proximity of
this field to. the constitutionally protected right of freedom of ex-
pression-all combine to make legal control a relatively clumsy
instrument. 30
Therefore, the SEC has left the regulation and oversight of corporate
publicity primarily to the exchanges, the NASD, the business and
financial community, and the press.
31
That the disclosure requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Acts do
not impose ageneral disclosure obligation is not disputed.32 However,
there is no similar consensus as to whether the anti-fraud provisions,
and particularly rule lOb-5, impose an affirmative duty to disclose.
33
While some commentators conclude that there is no such duty,
34
some believe that the issue is unsettled,35 others have concluded that
there is such a duty,36 and still others, although conceding that no
much is already known. The proposal would largely eliminate the periodic reporting require-
ments of the 1934 Act and the registration requirement of the 1933 Act and replace them
with general requirements of current disclosure of material facts. Address by Stephen J.
Friedman to the New York Chapter of the Financial Executives Institute, March 24, 1981,
reported in 58 Daily Report for Executives A-9 (BNA) (March 6, 1981). The effect of this
proposal would be to create an affirmative disclosure obligation with respect to covered
issuers.
30 SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKET, supra note 23, at 102.
31 Id
32 However, any such affirmative disclosure obligation is more consonant with the pri-
mary purpose of the disclosure requirments-creating a free flow of information to enable the
market to operate more efficiently-than the primary objective of the anti-fraud provisions
which is to prevent overreaching of investors. Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Ad-
vantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 334-38 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Brudney].
33 The issuer, of course, can remain silent concerning material developments only so long
as whatever other statements or disclosures it makes contemporaneously are not rendered
misleading by that silence. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 230.408.
34 6 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3596-97 (Supp. 1969); Cohen, Truth in Securities, 79
HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1364 (1966); Feurstein, The Corporation's Obligations of Disclosure Under the
Federal Securities Laws When It is Not Trading in Its Stock, 15 N.Y.L.F. 385, 391-92 (1969);
Fleischer, "Federal Corporate Law'" An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146, 1157-58 (1965);
Sommer, Forward-Sum: Report of the Advisogy Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 48, 54 (1978); Comment on Disclosure, supra
note 28.
35 Alberg, SEC Disclosure Requirements for Corporations, 26 Bus. LAW. 1223, 1224 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Alberg]; Allen, supra note 1, at 488; Fiffis, Soft Information: The SEC's
Former Exogenous Zone, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 95, 115 (1978); Shoenbaum, The Relationship Be-
tween Corporate Disclosure and Corporate Responsibiliy, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 565, 573 (1972).
36 Dickman, SEC Requirements of Disclosure of Inside Information, 26 INST. ON OIL & GAs L.
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court has clearly articulated such a duty, argue that such a duty
ought to be implied from the anti-fraud provisions.
37
Those commentators who conclude that there is an affirmative
duty to disclose material facts, or who argue that such a duty ought
to be established, find support in several judicial decisions. Some
rely on cases holding that there is no disclosure obligation when the
issuer has a legitimate business reason for secreting the information.38
The implication drawn is that, in the absence of a legitimate business
reason, the issuer should make full disclosure. 39 A similar implication
could be drawn from decisions holding that in order to avoid mis-
leadingly premature announcements, the timing of a release of infor-
mation should be left to the sound business discretion of the issuer.
40
Some commentators conclude, therefore, that these decisions are
& TAX'N 239, 251 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Dickman]; Flom & Atkins, The Expanding Scope
ofSEC Disclosure Laws, 52 HARV. Bus. REV. 109, 118 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Flom &
Atkins].
37 Bauman, supra note 24; Talesnick, supra note 9.
38 See, e.g., Matarese v. Aero Chatillion Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) §§ 93,322 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In the protracted Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation, the
SEC did not allege any violation by the issuer prior to its initial press release, despite the fact
that the issuer had consciously decided to withhold any information prior to that for the
stated reason of allowing acquisition of the adjoining land. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 843 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Thus the court was not
called upon to determine whether the issuer's earlier silence was a breach:
We do not suggest that material facts must be disclosed immediately; the timing of
disclosure is a matter for the business judgment of the corporate officers entrusted
with the management of the corporation within the affirmative disclosure require-
ments promulgated by the exchanges and the SEC. Here, a valuable corporate
purpose was served by delaying the publication of the K-55-1 discovery.
401 F.2d at 850 n.12. The issue was more squarely addressed in the civil litigation arising out
of the same events, where it was held that until the land acquisition program was completed
on March 27, 1964, there was a legitimate corporate purpose for non-disclosure. Summary
judgment for the issuer was therefore granted on the issue of breach of disclosure obligations
before that date. Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333, 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
The issue was left open, however, concerning the period from that date until disclosure was
made: "Whether TGS had a proper corporate purpose in not disclosing after March 27,
1964, and whether the lack of such -corporate purpose would give rise to a duty to disclose,
involve issues which cannot be determined on these motions for summary judgment." Id at
1338. Even if the court had resolved the latter issues, the timely disclosure policy of the New
York Stock Exchange, see notes 10-15 and accompanying text supra, upon which stock of
Texas Gulf Sulphur was listed, would have governed rather than the more general provisions
of rule lOb-5.
39 Bauman, supra note 24, at 957; Dickman, upra note 36, at 251. But see Comment on
Disclosure, supra note 28, at 804.
40 Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271,292 (7th Cir. 1981); SEC v. Geon Indus.,
Inc., 531 F.2d 39,48 (2d Cir. 1976); Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474
F.2d 514, 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); Staffin v. Greenberg, 509 F. Supp.
825, 836 (E.D. Pa. 1981), afd, 672 F.2d 1196 (3d Cir. 1982). The suggested implication
which might be drawn from these decisions is that but for the timing issue, disclosure would
be required.
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based upon an "unarticulated premise that the corporate defendant
owes a disclosure duty to the plaintiff' 41 to which these cases create
temporary exceptions.
42
Although this conclusion may be appealing at first glance, it is
simply not supported by the decisions from which it is drawn. Some
of these decisions must be limited to their particular facts.43 The
other decisions concerning the timing of disclosure and business pur-
poses for withholding information did not reach the question of a
general disclosure duty. It cannot be assumed that if the courts had
reached that issue they would have found such a duty.4 Indeed, the
most persuasive aspect of these decisions is that, given many opportu-
nities to do so, even during the climate of the ever-expanding juris-
prudence of 10b-5, not one court held that there was an affirmative
general obligation to disclose.
45
41 Allen, supra note 1, at 489.
42 Bauman, supra note 24, at 954, 976; Bauman, Corporate Disclosure and Dissemination,
CORPORATE NEWS DISSEMINATION (P.L.I.) 63, 89 [hereinafter cited as Bauman, Corporate
Disclosure]; Blackstone, supra note 28, at 84; Dickman, supra note 36, at 251; Flom & Atkins,
supra note 36, at 112; Ruder, Current Problems in Corporate Disclosure, 30 Bus. LAw. 1081, 1981
(1975). It has been suggested that SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 297 F. Supp. 470
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), and Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) also support an
affirmative disclosure duty by implication. Talesnick, supra note 9, at 400-02. However, be-
cause of the facts of each (Shattuck Denn involved non-correction of an earlier statement by the
issuer rendered incorrect by subsequent events, and Fisher concerned the special case of a
certified public accountant who learns that the financial statements he earlier certified were
in error) it seems inappropriate to draw such a broad implication from either one.
43 See note 42 supra.
44 The court in Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973), even pointed out that the plaintiff's burden in a
silence case included not only that the information was "ripe" for publication, but also that
"there existed a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff to so disclose as to do otherwise
would be a violation of Rule 10b-5. . . ." Id. at 521.
45 Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1204 (3d Cir. 1982); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIALS 950 (4th ed. 1977); Ruder, Mulible Defend-
ants in Securities Law Fraud Cases.: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiray, in Pari Delicto Indemnijfation
and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 622-23 (1972).
But see Issen v. GSC Enterprises, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Ill. 1982), where the
plaintiffs complained of the omission of the terms of loans to insiders from the defendant
corporation's annual report. The court stated that despite the absence of an explicit statutory
or regulatory duty to do so, a corporation must disclose all material facts in its annual report
since it has the "special relationship" with its shareholders, specified by Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), which triggers a duty to disclose material facts. To the extent
that this court intended to articulate a generally applicable affirmative disclosure obligation,
it stands alone. A more reasonable construction, however, is that when making other disclo-
sures, such as the annual report to shareholders, the omission of material facts which renders
the disclosure misleading constitutes a violation of lOb-5. Viewed in this manner, the deci-
sion is consistent with earlier decisions and the provisions of 10b-5 and does not create a
revolutionary afflirmative disclosure obligation of all material facts even in the absence of
trading or other disclosures by the issuer.
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Some commentators are persuaded that the SEC has taken the
position that the anti-fraud provisions impose an affirmative disclo-
sure duty,46 but this conclusion also will not withstand careful scru-
tiny. Certainly, the SEC has repeatedly encouraged and applauded
full and prompt disclosure by issuers,47 but it has never stated that
there is a duty, imposed by the securities laws, to disclose in the ab-
sence of trading or other disclosures. 4 On the contrary, the SEC has
consistently recognized that much corporate disclosure goes beyond
statutory requirements.
49
Understandably, some confusion concerning the SEC's position
has resulted from its release No. 5092.50 This release, which has been
termed the SEC's "basic" 5' and "most definitive" 52 statement con-
cerning a general affirmative disclosure obligation, almost com-
pletely conceals the SEC's position because of its poor draftsmanship.
It starts out by declaring, without qualification, that issuers have "an
obligation to make full and prompt announcements of material facts
regarding the company's financial condition. a53 Then, at the close of
the release, appears the admonishment "that unless adequate and
accurate information is available, a company may not be able to
purchase its own securities or make acquisitions using its securities,
46 Alberg, supra note 35, at 1225; Schoenbaum, supra note 35, at 5 73-74; Talesnick, supra
note 9, at 402-03; Comment, Liability Under Rule IOb-5for Negligenty Minedt'g Corporate Re-
leases. A Proposalfor the Apportionment of Losses, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 162, 170 n.40 (1973) [here-
inafter cited as Comment on Liability Under Rule 10b-5].
47 The following statement is an example:
There has been an increasing tendency, particularly in the period since World War
II, to give publicity through many media concerning corporate affairs which goes
beyond the statutory requirements. This practice reflects a commendable and
growing recognition on the part of industry and the investment community of the
importance of informing security holders and the public generally with respect to
important business and financial developments.
Securities Act Rel. No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957). See also SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MAR-
KETs, supra note 23, at 65; Address of former SEC Commissioner Sommer, "Financial Re-
porting in a Troubled Industry," June 5, 1975, discussed in Bauman, Corporate Disclosure,
supra note 42, at 98. In fact, the SEC may at times have indirectly enforced such an obliga-
tion by invoking its power to suspend trading when disclosure may be necessary to stem
unusual market activity. Cohen, sura note 34, at 1364. See also Faust, Disclosure-Fact and
Fancy, 2 SEC REG. L.J. 160, 162-63 (1974).
48 Bauman, Corporate Disclosure, supra note 42, at 96.
49 See authorities cited in note 47 supra.
50 Securities Act Rel. No. 5092, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
77,915 (Oct. 15, 1970).
51 SHEA, Maintenance of Ongoing Relationships in the Fianial Community, REPRESENTING
PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS 353 (P.L.I. 1980).
52 Comment on.Disclosure, supra note 28, at 812.
53 Securities Act Rel. No. 5092, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
77,915 (Oct. 15, 1970) (emphasis added).
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and its insiders may not be able to trade its securities without run-
ning a serious risk of violating section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. '54 In other words,
the "obligation" to disclose originally mentioned is nothing more
than a restatement of the well-worn principle of "disclose or abstain."
Thus, there is an obligation to disclose only if the issuer or an insider
trades.
55
Those who contend that there is an affirmative disclosure obli-
gation in the absence of trading or other disclosures have advanced
novel theories, supplemented by policy reasons, to buttress their posi-
tion. They have argued that by issuing its securities for public trad-
ing, the issuer impliedly represents that it will deal fairly with the
public and fair dealing encompasses complete disclosure.5 6 They
have also contended that an issuer's past history of multiple informa-
tional disclosures induces public reliance on the continuing validity
of such disclosures and creates an implied representation that the is-
suer will continue to disclose fully.5 7 Policy considerations advanced
are that current 1934 Act disclosures are insufficient and should be
supplemented by complete disclosure of all material facts; 58 investor
confidence cannot be fostered without complete disclosure;59 full dis-
closure by issuers is the only effective way to deal with insider trad-
ing;60 and, without required full disclosure, issuers will minimize the
54 Id.
55 Accord, Allen, supra note 1, at 488; Bauman, Corporate Disclosure, supra note 42, at 92;
Posner, supra note 28, at 1709-10; Sommer, supra note 34, at 54; Comment on Disclosure, sura
note 28, at 812. Contra Alberg, supra note 35, at 1225; Schoenbaum, sura note 35, at 573-74;
Talesnick, supra note 9, at 402-03; Comment on Liability Under Rule 10b-5, supra note 46, at
170 n.40.
The confusion bred by the poorly drafted Release No. 5092 was compounded by subse-
quent releases which incorporated by reference or repeated nearly verbatim the main point of
the earlier release. Securities Act Release No. 5447 (Dec. 20, 1974); Securities Act Release
No. 5263 (June 22, 1972). See aso Securities Act Release No. 5592 (Nov. 7, 1978). Securities
Act Release No. 5447 is arguably closer than any of the others to stating an affirmative disclo-
sure obligation because it describes the issuer's and insider's inability to trade without disclo-
sure as being "in addition" to the responsibility for full disclosure.
56 Bauman, supra note 24, at 944. Contra Comment on Disclosure, supra note 28, at 800.
This reasoning may have recent support in the SEC's pronouncement that "investors have
legitimate expectations that public companies are making, and will continue to make, prompt
disclosure of significant corporate developments." In re Sharon Steel Corp., Securities Ex-
change Act Rel. No. 18,271 (Nov. 19, 1981).
57 Bauman, supra note 24, at 944. See also Brudney, supra note 32, at 327; Talesnick, supra
note 9, at 385. Contra Comment on Disclosure, supra note 28, at 801-04.
58 Talesnick, supra note 9, at 371-76, 398, 406.
59 Bauman, supra note 24, at 954.
60 Fiflis, sura note 35, at 140 n. 171. For a current report on the apparent proliferation of
insider trading and how present tools to attack it are inadequate, see Louis, The Unwinnabl
War on insider Trading, FORTUNE, July 13, 1981, at 72.
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disclosures they do make, because of fear of liability resulting from
those disclosures being found misleading due to omissions.
61
Assuming arguendo that these implied representations and policy
considerations are legitimate objectives for rule 10b-5,62 the starting
point of any consideration of the securities laws must now be the
language of the statute and rule.63 It is difficult, if not impossible, to
fit the suggested result, full issuer disclosure even in the absence of
trading or other disclosures, into the language of section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5. Both the statute and rule require that the alleged fraud
be "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. ' 64 It is
difficult to conceive of a connection between total silence and a se-
curity transaction. Nevertheless, the requisite connection can proba-
bly be supplied by the same reasoning which supplied it for
affirmative misrepresentations by the issuer in the absence of issuer
transactions. There, reliance by investors on the misrepresentations
supplied the necessary connection. 65 In the case of omissions of mate-
rial facts, reliance by investors can still be presumed from material-
ity 6 6 and, therefore, the connection between the silence and the
purchase or sale of a security can be drawn.67 Although this ap-
proach toward the "in connection with" requirement would be of
doubtful validity if raised now for the first time, that it is a long
established rationale suggests that challenge is unlikely.
68
61 Allen, supra note 1, at 491.
62 A general refutation of these arguments may be found in Comment on Disclosure,
sura note 28.
63 Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 197 (1976).
64 Securities Exchange Act of 1934,. § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78; SEC rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1982).
65 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), cerl. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
66 Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). This, of course, is only a
rebuttable presumption. See, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 189 (3d Cir.
1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 284 (7th Cir. 1981).
67 Bauman, supra note 24, at 943; Bromberg, lob-5 Liabilitiesfor Non-disclosure, 1 INTRO-
DUCTION TO SECURITIES LAw DISCLOSURE 225, 251 (P.L.I. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Brom-
berg]; Dickman, supra note 36, at 250; Comment on Disclosure, supra note 28, at 797. But see
Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1203 (3d Cir. 1982), in which the court held that issuer
silence in the absence of issuer trading was not "in connection with" a purchase or sale of
securities. The court distinguished this from the situation where the issuer makes misleading
statements without contemporaneous trading, concluding that in the latter event "the stric-
tures of the 'in connection with' clause are loosened somewhat." Id. at 1204 n.8.
68 It would seem that a plausible argument could be made that section 10b and rule lOb-
5 were originally intended to deter fraud by purchasers and sellers of securities, and that the
"in connection with" clause was the means chosen to verbalize that limitation. Had this been
a question of first impression today, the current antipathy of the Supreme Court to expansion
of the coverage of the securities laws might well result in a different outcome. See notes 77-78
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A more serious obstacle is raised by the jurisdictional require-
ment that the alleged fraud be accomplished "by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange ... *"69 Silence, of
course, does not employ any of these means and, therefore, should
not be covered by the statute or rule. 70 However, it has been sug-
gested that the jurisdictional requirement, which has been very
broadly construed, 71 should be analyzed by focusing on the affected
purchase or sale in the same fashion as the "in connection with" re-
quirement. Thus, so long as the purchases or sales induced by the
silence are effected by the jurisdictional means, this requirement
would be satisfied.72 This approach has definite appeal when the
fraud alleged is in the context of a fraudulently induced sale by the
defendant to the plaintiff. In that situation, it makes little difference
whether the use of the jurisdictional means is initiated by the defend-
ant or plaintiff, so long as the jurisdictional means are utilized to-
ward completion of the fraud.73 However, in the case of issuer
silence, the alleged fraud (nondisclosure) is accomplished in the com-
plete absence of any of the jurisdictional means. Use of the jurisdic-
tional means by the plaintiff, such as purchasing the issuer's securities
on a national securities exchange, takes place after the purported
wrongful conduct of the defendant is complete. That subsequent use
and accompanying text 47fra. However, because the construction of the "in connection with"
language described in the text is of such long-standing, it will probably survive. Its survival,
parallels the survival of the private cause of action to enforce rule 10b-5 which was originally
created by an approach to statutory construction which would be wholly unacceptable today.
Compare Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), with Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979) and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,
444 U.S. 11 (1979). Nevertheless, the private cause of action under rule lob-5 is expected to
survive because it is so long established. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
577 n.19 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692 n.13 (1979); Frankel,
Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REv. 553, 562 (1981).
69 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
70 Loss, supra note 34, at 3597.
71 For example, it is not necessary for the misrepresentation or misstatement itself to be
transmitted by some means of interstate commerce, but only that such means or instrumen-
tality be used in connection with the transaction. Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir.
1953); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1975). The classic example of how the
jurisdictional requirement is applied loosely is that an intra-state telephone call may satisfy
the requirement. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 727-28 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968).
72 Talesnick, supra note 9, at 379-80.
73 See, e.g., 3 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 14, at § 11.2; Loss, supra note 34, at
1524-25. One of the often cited decisions in this area states: "[I]t is not material who insti-
tuted the communication [by telephone or mail]. Instead, the real question ir whether the mad or
instrumentality of interstate commerce were used to mislead the plainti. ." Travis v. Anthes Imp. Ltd.,
473 F.2d 515, 526 (8th Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
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does not relate to whether securities "fraud" was committed by the
silent issuer, but only to whether the "fraud" was effective in induc-
ing transactions. As Professor Loss, who initially raised the problem
of the absence of jurisdictional means in the area of issuer nondisclo-
sure, has stated: "It must not be overlooked that some use of the
mails or interstate facilities, however indirect, must be brought home to
defendant."74
An additional obstacle to implying an affirmative duty to dis-
close from the language of rule lOb-5 is that the rule speaks specifi-
cally of omission only in clause (2), which makes it unlawful to
"[o]mit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading . . . . 75 Because the affirmative disclosure
obligation under consideration in this article goes far beyond this
limited proscription, it would have to be based on one of the other
two clauses, if required by the rule.76 Yet it would be curious if the
other two clauses, which do not specifically mention omissions, were
construed to deal with omissions in a much more comprehensive
fashion than clause (2). Indeed, the qualified proscription of omis-
sions in clause (2) would be meaningless if the other two clauses ap-
plied to omissions without such qualification. The better
construction would seem to be that interpretation of either the first
or third clause to cover omissions. in the absence of trading is pre-
cluded by the more specific reference to omission in the second
clause.7
7
Most significant is the current attitude of the Supreme Court of
the United States. Since 1975 the Court has consistently taken a re-
74 Loss, supra note 34, at 3597 (emphasis added).
75 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1981).
76 Bromberg, supra note 67, at 242-43.
77 This is nothing more than a restatement of the statutory construction principle "ex-
pressio unius est exclusio alterius." 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 47.23 (4th ed. 1973).
There is some authority for the proposition that clauses (1) and (3) of rule lOb-5 encom-
pass complete omission. SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 197-99 (1963); 1
BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 14, at 51; 3 Loss, supra note 34, at 1439. Such an
interpretation is acceptable in the trading context. Limiting the insider trader's liability to
misleading half-truths under lOb-5(2), and excluding liability for complete silence would ef-
fectively immunize insider trading from liability because, typically, the insider is totally si-
lent. It does not necessarily follow, however, that clauses (1) and (3) of rule lOb-5 should be
extended to situations where the non-trading issuer is totally silent. The prohibition of half-
truths in clause (2) is consistent with an issuer's mandatory disclosure obligations. But, to
interpret clauses (1) and (3) as also prohibiting all issuer silence would carry the issuer's dis-
closure obligation far beyond the carefully constructed obligations of the mandated
disclosures.
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strictive view of the federal securities laws.78 The liberal construction
which placed greater emphasis on the security laws' general purpose
of investor protection than on their specific provisions79 is no longer
acceptable. It has been replaced by an analysis which starts with the
statutory language itself. If the statutory language is unambiguous,
the analysis also ends there. It is in this context that the question of
an affirmative obligation to disclose must be considered. In view of
the absence of any judicial decision ° or SEC statement 8' declaring
such a duty, it would be an expansion of the securities laws to create
it now. The carefully structured disclosure provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts, which clearly do not impose such a duty, hardly lend
themselves to an expansive interpretation, particularly by the present
Court. Thus, even though it might legitimately be viewed as a closer
step toward effecting the overall purpose of the securities laws, the
Supreme Court is unlikely to infer an affirmative disclosure obliga-
tion, in the absence of trading or other disclosures by the issuer, from
the unambiguous language chosen by Congress.
The balance of this article will proceed on the assumption that
no such duty exists. This precludes an easy answer to the present
inquiry, that issuers are compelled to respond to rumors, publicity, or
unusual market activity because of a general affirmative disclosure
obligation.
IV. The Limited Duty to Respond to Rumors
There is little disagreement about the issuer's min'mum duty to
respond to rumors and other publicly-disseminated information. Al-
though some feel the duty should be expanded,8 2 all agree that the
78 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors,
Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979);
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979); Sante Fe Indus. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (1975). Arguably this has not been an entirely dogmatic contraction of the
securities laws. Consider, for example, the decisions that scienter is not required in an SEC
action under § 17(a)(2) and (3) of the 1933 Act, Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), and that
a private cause of action may be maintained under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 1, et. seq. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982). See
generaly Brooks, Rule Iob-5 in the Balance: An Analsis of the Supreme Court's Po/iqy Perspective, 32
HASTINGS LJ. 403 (1980).
79 See, e.g., SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964).
80 See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
81 See notes 46-54 and accompanying text supra.
82 It has been argued, for example, that although the issuer should not be charged with
knowledge of everything published about it, .it should nevertheless speak up when it learns of
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issuer has a duty to respond when the rumor or report is attributable
to it. When such attribution will be deemed sufficient, however, is
far from settled.
The foundation for the issuer's duty to respond was laid in the
Texas Guf Sulphur litigation.8 3 Rumors concerning the company's
spectacular ore find began spreading by early 1964,84 became ram-
pant in Canada during early April, 1964, and were prominently re-
ported in the New York press on April 11, 1964.85 Texas Gulf
published errors, particularly when the errors appear in those sources upon which investors
are most likely to rely, such as the Wall Street Journal and the Dow Jones tape. Bauman,
Corporate Disclosure andDissemination, in CORPORATE NEws DISSEMINATION (P.L.I., R. Haft &
C. Wile eds. 1976). Anotb,:: author has similarly contended that "the best approach would
be to require a correction by the corporation if it learns of the statement and has no valid
corporate reason for withholding the facts." Jacobs, What is a Misleading Statement or Omission
Under Rule Iob-5, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 243, 259 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Jacobs on Mis-
leading Statements]. Others seem to have assumed that the timely disclosure policies of the
major exchanges, which clearly demand an issuer's response to known rumors or publicity, see
notes 9-25 and accompanying text supra, should be extended in principle to all issuers. See
CCH Executive Disclosure Guide § 1140 (1976); Fleischer, Corporate Disclosure/Insider Trading, 45
HARV. Bus. REv. 129, 133 (1967); Flom & Atkins, supra note 36, at 116; Haft, Corporate
"News" Dissemination - An Introduction, CORPORATE NEws DISSEMINATION 13 (P.L.I., R.
Haft & C. Wile eds. 1976); Shade, supra note 9, at 504.
The only decision which lends serious support to that position is that rendered in Green
v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ore. 1973), where the court stated:
A corporation cannot be held responsible for all omissions or misrepresentations
made about its financial condition and future prospects by every broker-dealer or
securities salesman. It is only obligated to take some action when it learns of such
misstatements or omissions and is aware that their publication or nonpublication
will be misleading to members of the investing public.
Id at 420. If taken literally, this passage clearly imposes a duty to respond without regard to
the source of the inaccuracy. Such a broad conclusion was not necessitated by the facts and
thus ought to be limited to its facts. Bauman, supra note 24, at 971-72. See also Peacock,
Correcting Rumors, 12 REv. SEC. REG. 901, 903 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Peacock]. A discus-
sion of the facts of Green appears at notes 150-55 infta and accompanying text.
Even if a broader meaning was intended by the court, two later Second Circuit decisions
implicitly reject it. In both Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980), and
State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981), the issuer learned
of publicity and was undoubtedly aware that the publicity would have an effect on the invest-
ing public, yet the issuer was held not have breached any duty to speak out.
83 The initial groundwork was actually laid in Mills v. Sarjem Corp.,- 133 F. Supp. 753
(D.N.J. 1955), where the sellers of stock alleged that the buyers breached the securities laws
because a letter to the buyers concerning the terms was incorrectly reported by the news
media. In rejecting this claim the court stressed the absence of allegations that the buyers
were responsible for the news report or that they even knew of those reports. However, the
real basis for the decision seems to have been the impossibility of plaintiff's reliance on the
erroneous newspaper reports of the content of a letter that the plaintiffs had previously re-
ceived. Id at 767.
84 Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 94 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971).
85 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev'd, 401 F.2d
833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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responded with the now famous "clarifying" press release on the fol-
lowing day which was subsequently found to be misleading.8 6 Al-
though the litigation surrounding those events was concerned
primarily with insider trading and the press release which was issued,
the various decisions charted a course for answering the question of
whether an issuer has a duty to make a statement concerning ru-
mors.87 First, by holding Texas Gulf liable for the misleading press
release it issued, the litigation resolved the question of whether an
issuer will be held responsible for its own statements. The decisions
also suggested that the issuer would not be held accountable for
statements and rumors from others. For example, in the context of
discussing whether Texas Gulf exercised due diligence in preparation
of the release, the court stated:
At the very least, if TGS felt compelled to respond to the spreading rumors
of a discovery it would have been more accurate to have stated that
the situation was in flux and that the release was prepared as of
April 10 information rather than purporting to report the progress
"to date."88
In his concurring opinion, Judge Friendly referred generally to cor-
porate responses to such rumors as being "not legally required."8 9
The Texas Guf Sulhur litigation thus suggested that issuer liability
would not be extended to statements made by others and that any
response from the issuer to such statements was optional. 90
That suggestion was expressly adopted in Electronic Specialty Co. v.
International Controls Corp. 9t In that case, it was reported in the press
that a rumored tender offeror had already acquired approximately
86 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
87 Neither the private damage actions nor the SEC enforcement action sought to impose
liability on Texas Gulf for failure to respond to the rumors prior to April 12. SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 978 (1969); Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Astor v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Perhaps that was because the
company did respond just one day after the first broad publication of the rumors in this
country. In view of the scientific complexity of the subject matter involved, even the most
stringent duty to respond would probably not have demanded a more prompt response.
88 401 F.2d at 863-64 (emphasis added).
89 Id at 867 (Friendly, J., concurring).
90 On remand from the Second Circuit, the trial court noted:' "When a company chooses
to issue a press release to respond to spreading rumors regarding its activities, it must describe
the true picture at the time of the press release. . . ." SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312
F. Supp. 77, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modiftd, 466 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
(1971) (emphasis added). If an issuer can "choose" whether to respond to rumors, a response
is not mandatory.'
91 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
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5% of the target company's outstanding stock and intended to offer
between forty-five and fifty dollars per share. In fact, the offeror had
acquired less than 2 1/2% of the target company's shares and the
reported offering price was without foundation. There was no evi-
dence that the offeror was the source of this report. The court re-
jected the target company's claim that the offeror was under a duty
to correct these errors, holding that "[w]hile a company may choose
to correct a misstatement in the press not attributable to it . . . we
find nothing in the securities legislation requiring it to do so. '"92 In
other words, the court refused to extend the issuer's responsibility to
include a duty to correct erroneous public information when such
information was not attributable to it. The converse proposition,
that the issuer does have a duty to correct errors attributable to it, is
clearly implied.93
Several commentators have questioned whether Electronic Se-
cia[y should be read so broadly and have suggested that it should be
limited to its particular facts. The important facts were that the of-
feror had a valid business reason for non-disclosure at the time, that
the entire tender offer process had a statutorily prescribed timetable
for disclosure in the Williams Act,94 under which offeror disclosure
was not yet due, and that there was a possibility that the false report
had actually been planted by the target company to thwart the offer.
It has been suggested that without these mitigating facts the court
might have expanded further the issuer's duty to respond. 95 How-
ever, subsequent decisions have applied the Electronic Specialty hold-
ing without limiting it to its facts. 96 Moreover, the Electronic Specaity
result has been consistently applied in the takeover area, where it
would-be most ludicrous to require one party in a takeover battle to
92 Id at 949.
93 Although Electronic Specialty decided this question under § 14(e) of the 1934 Act, the
anti-fraud provision of the Williams Act pertaining to tender offers, 409 F.2d at 949, the
reasoning and the result are equally applicable to § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Elkind v. Liggett &
Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afd in part and re 'd in part on other grounds,
635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
94 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(0 (1976).
95 Allen, supra note 1, at 495; Bauman, Corporate Disclosure and Dissemination, in CORPO-
RATE NEWS DISSEMINATION 100, 109-110 (P.L.I., R. Haft & C. Wile eds. 1976); 5 A. JACOBS,
THE IMPACT OF RULE 10B-5 § 8804 [b], at 4-17 n.8 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Jacobs]. See
also Dayan, Correcting Errors in the Press, 5 REv. OF SEC. RE . 941, 942 (1972).
96 State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981); Elkind v.
Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Zucker v. Sable, 426 F. Supp. 658
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also SEC v. Geon Indus., 521 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); Hutto v. Texas
Income Prop. Corp., 416 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R., 51
F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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correct the misstatements of the other.97
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has
been twice called upon within the last two years to rule again on the
question of issuer duty to respond to publicity. In both instances, the
holding in Electronic Specialy was unequivocally reaffirmed. In Elkind
v. Lzggetl & Myers, Inc. ,98 security analysts had published optimistic
projections of issuer performance which turned out to be erroneous
and inconsistent with the issuer's own estimates. In rejecting the con-
tention that the issuer was obligated to correct the projections, the
court stated that it "readily agree[d] that Electronic Specialty is the law
of this circuit." 99 Shortly thereafter, in State Teachers Retirement Board
v. Fluor Corporation,100 the Second Circuit was presented with a similar
question as to whether the issuer had a duty to correct marketplace
rumors concerning itself. This case was perhaps more significant be-
cause the lower court had boldly expanded the issuer's duty far be-
yond the attribution principle.10' On appeal, the issuer's duty to
correct rumors was again restricted to the Electronic Specialty standard:
"A company has no duty to correct or verify rumors in the market-
place unless those rumors can be attributed to the company."
10 2
97 Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assoc., 483 F.2d 247, 273 (1973); In re Com-
monwealth Oil/Tesoro Petro. Corp. Sec. Litigation, 467 F. Supp. 227, 239 (W.D. Tex. 1979);
Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 370 F. Supp. 597, 602 (D.N.J. 1974), aJ'd, 497
F.2d 394 (3d Cir.); BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS, supra note 14, at 148.28.
-98 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
99 Id at 163. This portion of the decision principally addressed whether the issuer had so
entangled itself with the published projections that they could be attributable to the issuer.
See notes 141-49 and accompanying text infra.
100 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981).
101 The district court adopted the view of several commentators that when possible the
issuer should correct rumors, even if from unrelated sources, to better serve the overall pur-
pose of investor protection:
[E]ven in the absence of insider trading or prior inaccurate disclosures, this court
believes a violation of lOb-5(c) may arise from a failure to disclose where, as here,
the rumors are rampant, the price of the stock is shooting upward and the defend-
ants are in possession of all the material facts but refrain from disclosing them. In
such cases, liability could be imposed only upon a showing that the failure to dis-
close was motivated by defendant's intent to deceive investors for their own gain
since a wrongful purpose is required to establish liability'in a private action under
Rule lOb-5.
500 F. Supp. 278, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981). In reaching this
conclusion, the only reference to Electronic Specialty and Elkind was in a "but see" citation. Id
at 292. However, one commentator interprets the district court opinion in Fluor as'a restric-
tive rather than an expansive view of the duty to disclose because of its reliance on the busi-
ness judgement rule. Vaughn, Timing of Disclosure, 13 REv. SEC. REG. 912 (1980).
102 State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981). As an
alternative to the asserted duty to respond to rumors, the plaintiff in Fluor argued that an
issuer which chooses to remain silent in the face of rumors or other publicity should at least
attempt to have trading in its securities halted pending release of the information. Any fail-
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V. Is the Electronic Specialty Rule Sound?
More important than how often or how consistently Electronic
Specialy has been followed is whether the rule announced by the
court is supported by reason. The policy justification most often
given is that the issuer cannot be held responsible for the accuracy of
all that is said and published about it, and it would be an impossible
burden to require that the issuer discover and correct all errors con-
cerning its affairs.' 0 3 In essence, it is argued that the issuer should
not be held responsible for not correcting misstatements by others of
which it was unaware. Although that proposition can hardly be dis-
puted, it alone does not justify limiting issuer responsibility to mis-
statements attributable to it. There will often be errors not so
attributable which, nonetheless, are known to the issuer.
The policy justification for the Electronic Specialty rule has also
been buttressed by the valid concern that when rumors are circulat-
ing it is often difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain the precise con-
tent of the rumor. In addition, the rumor may be unwittingly
modified through multiple transmissions, with the result that several
different but related rumors may be extant. In such a climate, it is
perhaps unfair to impose a duty to respond on the issuer because the
issuer will not know exactly to what it must respond.'0 4 Again, while
seemingly correct in principle, this justification for the rule is not
complete because it does not address whether the issuer should re-
spond to other publicly circulating information, such as news reports
or market letters, where the content is readily ascertainable.
ure to notify the exchange and seek a halt to trading would, according to this argument,
violate lOb-5. I at 850. The court rejected the argument on several grounds. It held:
(1) that under the facts of the case (particularly that the rumors were having little, if any,
impact on the market) there was no indication that an earlier suspension of trading was
necessary; (2) that in view of its candid responses to the exchange's inquiries and acquiescence
in the ultimate suspension of trading there was an absence of scienter on the part of the issuer;
and (3) that whether the exchange would have been receptive to an earlier request for cessa-
tion of trading was purely speculative. I at 851. Each of these conclusions, however, was
dependent on the facts of the case and did not reject the theory of the argument. In addition,
the court refused to find an alternative duty because a request to halt trading is simply not
required by the New York Stock Exchange Manual. Id at 851 n.7. This last conclusion
rejects not only the applicability but also the rationale of the argument.
103 Zucker v. Sable, 426 F. Supp. 658, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Milberg v. Western Pac. R.R.
Co., 51 F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Allen, supra note 1, at 495-96; Bauman, supra note
24, at 940; Jacobs on Misleading Statements, supra note 82, at 258-59; Peacock, supra note 82,
at 901.
104 [T]he very nature of rumors lends support to the position that there should be no
general obligaiion to dispel them. The corporation cannot be certain it has ob-
tained a complete version of the rumor, and answering an incomplete version may
merely disseminate more incorrect (or at least partial) information.
Allen, supra note 1, at 495-96. See atso Peacock, supra note 82, at 905.
THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Another reason advanced in support of limiting the issuer's duty
to respond only to information attributable to it is that it avoids forc-
ing the issuer into a posture of undesired and, perhaps, unnecessary
disclosure. For example, if an erroneous earnings projection is dis-
seminated, the issuer, if forced to respond, might feel compelled to
prepare and distribute its own projections even though it otherwise
chooses not to engage in earnings projections. 105 However, it would
seem that even if the issuer had a duty to respond, the duty would be
fulfilled by a simple disclaimer of responsibility for the published
projection. 106
Finally, it is a justifiable concern that a broader duty to respond
might be used as a tool to force corporate disclosure by an unscrupu-
lous analyst or takeover opponent. 107 For instance, an analyst too
anxious to await regular periodic disclosure might, without founda-
tion, plant a news item suggesting a material change in the issuer's
earnings in the hope of forcing the issuer into a premature earnings
release.
As always, there are competing concerns. A narrow duty to re-
spond allows the one party most likely to know the truth, the issuer,
to stand mute while the market labors under false or unconfirmed
information.108 Obviously, market efficiency and investor confidence
will be sacrificed to some degree. Furthermore, rendering an issuer
response optional rather than mandatory will perhaps encourage is-
suer silence, because the risk of material misstatement or omission in
the response and the resulting potential liability for violation of the
securities laws are so great.'0 9
On balance, however, the limitation of the obligation to respond
105 Jacobs on Misleading Statements, supra note 82, at 258-59. See also Schneider, Fnancial
Protections, 7 REv. SEC. REG. 907 (1974).
106 Fiflis, supra note 35, at 144 n.199.
107 Address by SEC Chairman G. Bradford Cook, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 79,341 (Apr. 19, 1973) fhereinafter cited as Address by Cook]; Allen, supra note
I, at 496; Peacock, supra note 82, at 902. Because of the nature and timing of the news report
concerning the takeover battle at issue in Electronic Specialo, there was a strong suspicion that
the target company planted the story in order to force disclosure of the aggressor's intentions.
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 949 (2d Cir. 1969).
108 JACOBS, supra note 95, at 4-29 n.27. See also Address by Cook, supra note 107; Fiflis,
supra note 35, at 140 n.171.
109 If the only choices open to a corporation are either to remain silent and let false
rumors do their work, or to make a communication, not legally required, at the risk
that a slip of the pen or failure properly to access or weigh the facts - all judged in
the light of hindsight - will lead to large judgements, payable in the last analysis
by innocent investors, for the benefit of speculators and their lawyers, most corpora-
tions would opt for the former.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring).
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only to rumors and other publicity which are attributable to the is-
suer is a workable and sensible rule. Although achieving the statu-
tory goal of full and accurate information in the securities markets is
important, it does not justify thrusting the entire burden of that goal
upon the issuer. Securities law responsibilities and liabilities should
be assigned not solely with reference to statutory goals, but also with
regard to responsibility for breach. The serious consequences of be-
ing held to have violated the securities laws should not be imposed on
any party irrespective of fault. Holding the issuer liable for not cor-
recting errors of others clearly extends the issuer's responsibilities be-
yond traditional concepts of fault. But restricting the issuer's duty to
correct publicity attributable to itself limits issuer responsibility in a
manner consonant with fault concepts because it confines the issuer's
responsibility to its own misconduct and does not hold it liable for
the misconduct of others.' 10
It is perhaps dangerous to base legal analysis upon a loose and
easily manipulated concept such as "fault." What constitutes action-
able fault may change over time as society's views of when injury or
loss should be compensated alter." ' For example, it was once well
110 This same sentiment seems to have been behind the more straightforward conclusion
in Zucker v. Sable, 426 F. Supp. 658, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), that "it would be unreasonable to
require the defendants to correct errors not of their making." See also Schneider & Shargel,
Now That You Are Publicly Owned..., 36 Bus. LAw. 1631, 1644 (1981), where the attribution
principle has been paraphrased as requiring a reaction from the company "where there is a
rumor or a market report circulating for which the company had some responsiblity."
There is a temptation to draw support for this conclusion from the scienter element.
Certainly the requirement of some degree of intent beyond mere negligence to establish a
violation of the anti-fraud provisions carries with it the notion that liability must be founded
on the actor's fault. Thus one authority has characterized the scienter element in the follow-
ing terms:
The authorities are virtually unanimous that the pertinent inquiry is the defend-
ant's actions, the plaintiff's harm alone being insufficient to establish a cause of
action. The ascribed reason for this approach is to confine liability to those who are
sufficiently culpable. Were the plaintiff's injury the touchstone, recovery would be
permitted for any misstatement or omission, no matter how innocently made.
A. JACOBS, supra note 95, at 3-192 to 3-193. On closer scrutiny, however, it appears that a
duty to respond broader than that suggested herein is not necessarily inconsistent with the
scienter element. For example, if the issuer's duty to respond was expanded to known inaccu-
racies about which the issuer had no business reason to remain silent, a knowing breach of
that duty when the issuer is fully aware that harm is likely to result from public reliance on
the inaccuracy could easily be viewed as sufficiently reckless if not intentional misconduct.
Consequently, the requirement of scienter does not mean that the issuer's duty to respond
must be limited to errors attributable to it.
111 Professor Prosser, while noting that "fault" in the law of torts is not a concept of moral
blame, stated: "There is a broader sense in which 'fault' means nothing more than a depar-
ture from'a standard of conduct required of a man by society for the protection of his neigh-
bors . . . ." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 493 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER ON TORTS]. As society's standards of conduct inevitably
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settled that a product manufacturer's responsibility for injuries
caused by its product was limited to negligent manufacture or de-
sign. Now that concept has been expanded to impose liability for
harm caused by an unreasonably dangerous defective condition in
the product even when the manufacturer was not negligent.11 2 Fur-
ther examples of the transient nature of fault concepts may be found
in the metamorphosis of liability in connection with securities trans-
actions. Although the duty to abstain or disclose was essentially un-
known to the common law, 113 .it is now well established under the
anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws. 114 Thus, an analysis pre-
mised on fault might be superficially dismissed by the assertion that
expanding an issuer's duty to respond is nothing more than recogni-
tion of the continuing evolution of the fault concept.
In this instance, however, the difference is in kind and not sim-
ply in degree. Expansion of the issuer's duty to respond to rumors
and publicity of others is nothing less than rendering the issuer re-
sponsible for the actions of others. That is even a more drastic depar-
ture from fault concepts than the examples cited previously, all of
which expand the actor's responsibility for its own actions but not for
the actions of others. 1X5 Although one party may become responsible
change, actionable fault will also. Prosser noted: "In a very vague general way, the law of
torts reflects current ideas of morality, and when such ideas have changed, the law has kept
pace with them." Id at 17.
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 402A. Seegenerally PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note
111, chap. 17.
113 See Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). Nevertheless, some courts
did attempt to find that kind of a rule, at least in face-to-face as opposed to anonymous
market transactions, based on "special facts," Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), or "ut-
most fairness," Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) TORTS § 551.
114 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). The Supreme Court has recently restricted the disclose or abstain rule to
those instances where the defendant had a duty to disclose "arising from a relationship of
trust and confidence between parties to a transaction." Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 230 (1980). While this result may make liability for non-disclosure look very similar to
simple common law liability, there are still significant differences. For example, under com-
mon law it was usually held that only corporate insiders had a duty to disclose and that the
duty was owed only to the corporation itself, not its shareholders. Note, Securities Regulation-
Insider Trading-Duty of Non-Insiders to Disclose Material Nonpublic Information, 48 TENN. L. REV.
161, 164 n.12, 165 n.14 (1980). Under common law, a corporate insider might owe no duty to
speak to buyers who do not become shareholders until after the transaction is completed and
a "tippee" might have no such relationship giving rise to a duty. Cann, A Duty to Disclose? An
Analysis of Chiarella v. United States, 85 DICK. L. REV. 249, 262-63 (1981). The Chiarella
decision is not limited in any of these respects.
115 Although the so-called "strict liability" which a product manufacturer now faces may
be properly characterized as liability without fault, it is not liability without responsibility.
The manufacturer is only being held liable for defects in its own products from which it
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for the actions of others in a "control" relationship, or under an
agency or respondeat superior theory, 116 these concepts have been
confined to those situations where the person in control is answerable
for the other's misconduct. By contrast, requiring the issuer to cor-
rect rumors and publicity imposes on it potential liability for conduct
in which it did not participate and which was engaged in by others
wholly unrelated to the issuer and over whom the issuer has no power
or control. Such a departure from traditional notions of fairness,
fault, and responsibility" is highly questionable and certainly should
not be implied solely for the convenience of effecting a generalized
statutory purpose.
VI. The Meaning of "Attributable"
The Electronic Specialy rule that an issuer is not obligated to cor-
rect rumors and other publicity not attributable to it, is too ambigu-
ous to be of much help in resolving specific cases. The ambiguity
results from uncertainty in the meaning of "attributable." For exam-
ple, does the rule apply only to situations where the issuer' 17 is, in
earned a profit on sale, not for anything done by others. Even though dealers other than the
manufacturer who are in the business of selling the product are also subject to such strict
liability, by virtue of selling the product for a profit they also share the responsibility for
distributing the unreasonably dangerous product to the public. Thus, their liability arises
from their own actions and is not imposed solely because of the actions of the manufacturer.
116 An issuer of securities may also be secondarily liable under these concepts by reason of
its failure to respond to rumors. For example, in the controlling person provisions of the
securities laws, § 15 of the 1933 Act and § 20(a) of the 1934 Act, if the issuer has a controlling
influence over the source of the rumor or publicity, or over someone who neglected an obliga-
tion to correct the publicity, and if the controlled person thereby committed a violation of the
securities laws, the issuer may also be responsible secondarily. Once the primary violation
and control relationship are established, the issuer may assert its own good faith as a defense.
An issuer who was unaware of the publicity, or being aware of the rumor or report, was
unaware of the attendant securities law violations, and had no constructive knowledge of the
foregoing, should not suffer liability under either of the controlling person provisions.
Under the common law theories of agency and respondeat superior, secondary liability
may be imposed on the issuer with respect to a primary violation committed by an agent
within his authority or scope of employment. These theories resemble the controlling person
provisions because an agency relationship is also dependent upon the power of control. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 2(2). There is also, however, a significant differ-
ence. The vicarious liability which flows from agency or respondeat superior is strict liability
in the sense that it cannot be avoided by the issuer's good faith. Accordingly, should an agent
or servant commit a primary violation by starting or spreading a false rumor, or by taking
advantage of such a false report by trading, and if those actions are within the agent's author-
ity or the servant's scope of employment, the issuer may be vicariously and thus secondarily
responsible even though it was unaware of the primary violation or even of the rumor itself.
117 In the discussion of whether the publicity is attributable to the issuer, the issuer will be
deemed to include not only the issuer as defined in section 2(4) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(b)(4), and section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10), but also officers,
directors and other management personnel whose duties include public disclosure. A. JA-
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fact, the source of the rumor or publicity, or could it be interpreted
more liberally to include any situation where the issuer is erroneously
cited as the source? In either of these two extreme cases, and in many
cases in between, it might be definitionally correct to say that the
rumor is "attributable" to the issuer. It is imperative, therefore, to
ascertain exactly how the term should be construed before the gen-
eral duty can be consistently applied.
The clearest example of when a rumor or publicity is attributa-
ble to the issuer is when the issuer is, in fact,*the source. If that is all
that Electronic Specialty and its progeny intended, however, they ad-
ded nothing to the already decided law. Texas Gu/f Sulphur had al-
ready established that an issuer has a duty of accuracy in its public
statements even in the absence of trading.1 8 Also, a failure to correct
the issuer's own misstatements is nothing more than a continuing vio-
lation of the duty breached upon the original misstatement.' 9 In
addition, because rumors seldom have an identifiable source, the
COBS, supra note 95, at 4-16 n.5. For example, if while carrying out his corporate responsibili-
ties the president makes an erroneous public statement, that statement should be deemed to
have been made by the corporate issuer for purposes of deciding whether the issuer has a duty
of correction. The issuer's duty to correct is thus a primary duty not dependent upon applica-
tion of principles of secondary or vicarious liability. Compare Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand,
649 F.2d 175, 182 n.8 (3d Cir. 1981):
We note that high ranking officers in a corporation, or partners in a partnership,
present a different situation from lower level employees. Officers are able to make
policy and generally carry authority to bind the corporation. Their action in behalf
of the corporation is therefore primary, and holding a corporation liable for their
actions does not require respondeat superior. The First Circuit apparently recog-
nized this precept, stating in Holmes [v. Bateson] that the corporation "cannot es-
cape its primary liability to the party defrauded."
583 F.2d at 561. But see Bauman, sura note 24, at 968-69. See also Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972) and Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec. Corp., 363 F. Supp.
574 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), in which the liability of the corporation was held, without any discus-
sion of agency principles, to be "co-extensive" with its principal officers and directors who
actually perpetrated the fraud.
118 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 857-64 (2d. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). The court in Texas Guf Sulphur, however, did limit the issuer's liability to the
misstatements made "in a manner reasonably calculated to affect the market price of TGS
stock and to influence the investing public," because only those could be said to be "in con-
nection with the purchase and sale" of a security. Id at 864. This referred to those state-
ments intended for publication and dissemination as opposed to those issued in confidence.
Electronic Specialty, even if confined to creating a duty to respond when the issuer is the origi-
nal source, would possibly have expanded the law to a limited degree by rendering the issuer
responsible for correcting its own misstatements which were not made in a manner reasonably
calculated to affect the market, but which nevertheless did have that effect because of a leak,
greater publicity of the statement than anticipated, or otherwise.
119 Compare ALI Federal Securities Code § 1602(b), in which comment 3 states that a
"failure to correct a belatedly discovered defect [in one's own earlier statement] is neither
more nor less than a continuing violation of § 1602(a) [the general antifraud provision]."
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duty to correct, if construed so narrowly, would rarely be applicable.
Thus, although the duty to correct must encompass those instances
where the issuer is the source, it should not be limited to that
situation. 12
0
How broadly the rule ought to be applied should be resolved
with reference to the rationale underlying it, i.e., the fault of the is-
suer in the dissemination of the inaccuracy. 121 In other words,
whether the issuer has a duty to respond to public information or
rumors should turn on whether the issuer was at fault with regard to
the original publication. Correction of its own inaccuracies fits
neatly into this approach, because the issuer is clearly to blame for
the original misleading of the market. Although the courts which
have been called upon to apply the Electronic Specialy rule in different
contexts have not articulated their rationales, the results have been
consistent with a fault analysis.
The possible fact variations may be viewed as a continuum, with
the cases where the issuer is the source of the rumor or inaccuracy at
one extreme of the continuum, the cases where the issuer is demon-
strably not the source at the other extreme, and the cases where the
source of the information is doubtful falling in between these two
extremes. The variations will be analyzed in the order suggested by
the continuum, beginning with the situation where the issuer is the
source.
A. When the Issuer Is the Source of the Rumor
As indicated earlier, "attributable" must, at the very least, in-
clude any case where the issuer itself is the source of the inaccuracy.
A somewhat analogous situation is when the issuer is the source of
the information, but the inaccuracy is traceable only to the transmis-
sion. The clearest example is a correct press release by the issuer
120 It bears noting that the various formulations of the rule, such as "supplied by or attrib-
uted to" the issuer, Jacobs on Misleading Statements, supra note 82, at 258, and "can be
attributed" to the issuer, State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir.
1981), easily lend themselves to a broader interpretation. But see Zucker v. Sable, 426 F.
Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). According to one commentator, Zucker interpreted the Electronic
Spcialfy holding as being limited to those instances where the issuer is the source. Bauman,
supra note 24, at 968. This conclusion is undoubtedly based upon the statement in Zucker that
"it would be unreasonable to require the defendants to correct errors not of their making."
426 F. Supp. at 663. As indicated previously, however, see note 110 sura, the better construc-
tion of the conclusion in Zucker is that issuer liability for failure to correct should be restricted
to those instances when the issuer bears some responsibility for the piblicity, not just where
the issuer was the source.
121 See notes 110-15 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of "fault" as that con-
cept is used herein.
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which is misquoted, misunderstood, or otherwise garbled by the
press. As a general proposition, the error is then attributable solely to
the press with the consequent absence of any fault or responsibility
for the error on the part of the issuer. The issuer, therefore, should
not have a duty to respond or to correct the error.122 Thus, when the
release is misreported because of negligence or clerical error of the
media, the issuer need say nothing further. 123 The responsibility for
the erroneous report of an accurate release, however, often will not be
so easily isolated. If the release drafted by the issuer is ambiguous,
poorly drafted, technically complex, or if the press is asked to publish
the information in haste, it may be that the responsibility for the
erroneous report is not the media's alone. 124 When preparing and
releasing information, the issuer clearly has a duty of due diligence 125
and that duty may be breached in any of the given examples which
suggest that errors in reporting by the press are foreseeable because of
the issuer's own deficiencies in the preparation of the release. Bear-
ing at least a portion of the responsibility for the dissemination of the
inaccuracy, the issuer, under fault analysis, can reasonably be re-
quired to correct the error.
126
122 Cf Zucker v. Sable, 426 F. Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In that case the issuer issued a
press release announcing an "investigational" new drug application with the Food and Drug
Administration. An "investigational" application allegedly signified that it would be at least
several years before the drug would be approved for commercial production. Various
financial journals omitted the word "investigational" from their reports. The court held that
the issuer had no duty to correct these erroneous reports of its accurate press release. But see
Bauman, Corporate Disclosure, supra note 42, at 105; A. JACOBS, supra note 95, § 88.04[b], at
4016 n.4 (both argue for a duty to correct garbled press releases).
123 Jacobs on Misleading Statements, supra note 82, at 258-59. The example given by
Jacobs is where the media, as a result of a negligent transposition, reports earnings of
S 190,000.00 rather than the correct figure of $910,000.00 listed in the company's press release.
For this type of clerical error, which may have an obvious impact on the market if left uncor-
rected, Jacobs concludes there is no duty to speak out. Id at 159 n.89.
124 In the Texas GulfSulphur litigation, one of the defenses raised by Texas Gulf was that
even if held liable for the press release itself, it should not be liable for the inaccurately or
incompletely reported versions. Texas Gulf asserted that the media materially distorted the
release by omitting the company's promise to issue a definite statement when more informa-
tion was available and by reporting a portion of the release out of context. The trial court
was unpersuaded by the argument, stating that by issuing the press release "for immediate
release," the company was depending on the press to report to its shareholders and could not
expect the entire release to be reported verbatim. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F.
Supp. 77, 86-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modifid on other grounds, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971). The holding implicitly suggests that by designating the information
"for immediate release," with the knowledge that the release would be edited before report-
ing, errors by the media could be anticipated by the issuer.
125 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 863 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969). The initial holding regarding due diligence in the preparation of press releases
must, of course, now be tempered by the element of scienter.
126 When the issuer thereby shares in the responsibility for the error and consequently has
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Precisely when the issuer can anticipate an error in reporting for
which a duty to correct arises will be a fact question in each case. In
all circumstances, however, care must be exercised in order not to
lose sight of whether the issuer shares blame for the inaccuracy. For
instance, press releases are virtually always edited and errors may
result. This, in itself, would be insufficient to create a duty to correct
because nothing suggests any issuer responsibility for the error.
127
Similarly, reporter incompetence, even if suspected by the issuer,
should not, by itself, result in a duty to correct. The resulting errors
in the report, although foreseeable, were not caused by the issuer. As
a practical matter, however, the issuer's contention that it was not
responsible for and had no duty to correct erroneous reports of com-
pany releases will often be an unappealing one. The issuer initially
attempted to inform the public by the release and, in all probability,
was aware of the inaccurate reporting. It would not be surprising,
therefore, if factfinders were predisposed to find some issuer responsi-
bility for the error. Thus, the issuer might be well advised to notify
the press that a correction is necessary. Since the issuer has already
determined to inform the public by the first release, there will seldom
be any corporate interest served by silence.'
28
a duty to correct it, it might even be reasonable to require the issuer to verify the accuracy of
the reporting of the release, at least in the most prominent media. Compare Bauman, supra
note 24, at 951-52, which argues that a duty to correct a garbled press release should include
an affirmative duty to review the reporting of the release in "those publications on which the
corporation reasonably believes investors are most likely to rely." For an issuer of national
importance this might include the Dow Jones Broad Tape and The Wall Street Journal, and
for other issuers it might be limited to -reports in local newspapers. The significance of this
conclusion is that although the scienter requirement may often shield the issuer from liability
for reporting errors of which it is unaware, it need not insulate an issuer which intentionally
chooses to remain ignorant of press reports of its own informational releases and which has
reason to suspect or anticipate erroneous reporting.
127 For example, in Texas Gulf &hur discussed in note 124 supra, the court stressed that
the information was issued "for immediate release," and that the issuer could not have ex-
pected the media to publish the entire release. 312 F. Supp. at 86. The implication is that the
issuer's knowledge that the release would be edited was not alone sufficient to impose liability
for error in the report. Rather, the issuer must have contributed in some way to the likeli-
hood of error, such as by encouraging immediate publication. By prompting haste, the issuer
might reasonably expect, and therefore foresee, resulting errors in the news report. Contra,
Jacobs on Misleading Statements, supra note 82, at 159 n.88, where the author concludes that
the fact that the release was issued "for immediate release" should not make a difference in
result. The author asserts that a better rationale for the decision is that "the risk of error [in
reporting a release] is on the issuer whenever the release can be easily misconstrued." Id
Even this rationale is consistent with that advanced in this article. An issuer that distributes a
news release subject to easy misconstruction can readily anticipate that misconstruction and
thus is at least partially responsible when such misconstruction occurs.
128 If the initial company release was pursuant to a duty to speak, the issuer may be
constrained to correct the erroneous report even in the absence of any responsibility for the
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Related to the garbled press release is the problem of the mis-
quoted interview with the press or with financial analysts.1 29 On a
theoretical level, the resolution should be approached in the same
manner as the erroneously reported press release. Unless the issuer
shares some responsibility for the erroneous report of the intervieiw,
such as responding to questions in an ambiguous or overly technical
manner, the issuer should have no duty to correct. On a practical
level, however, there are significant differences. Compared to a care-
fully drafted press release, statements made during an interview,
even when given some advance thought, are oral, extemporaneous,
and often difficult to verify. 130 Thus, there is a greater likelihood
that statements by company management are at least a contributing
cause to the inaccurate report. In any event, uncertainty over what
was said, absent a verbatim transcript or recording of the interview,
renders a defense based on an issuer's lack of responsibility risky.
Both the reporter or analyst and the executive may sincerely recollect
different versions of the same interview, leaving the fact finder with
no solid basis for resolving the dispute.
Another related situation arises where the issuer gives an "off the
record" interview or comment which contains inaccuracies but was
not intended for publication.131 In that event, the issuer may assert
that it is free from fault in the dissemination of the inaccuracy, even
though the error is, in some sense, attributable to it. Of course, this
conclusion will depend upon the facts. While "off the record" press
error. For example, the disclose or abstain rule requires that material information be "effec-
tively disclosed" to the public before insiders may trade. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968). Effective disclosure certainly requires accurate public dissemi-
nation. Consequently, in the event of misreporting of a correct release, neither the issuer nor
its insiders should be permitted to trade until a correction is publicized. See also ALI Pro-
posed Federal Securities Code, § 1602(b)(comment 8(b)), in which a duty to correct garbled
reports of a press release issued pursuant to a duty to speak is left to ad hoc determination on
the facts.
129 The similarity of the manner in which the issues may arise is illustrated by SEC v.
Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 297 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), where a news report con-
cerned an earlier interview with a company official regarding the financing arrangement for
an acquisition by the company. The company official claimed that he could not be liable for
inaccuracies in the news report because it did not mention that such financing was "subject to
long term financing," which the official alleged he stressed in the interview. The court, how-
ever, was unconcerned with that alleged omission because it found the official's statements to
the reporter false in other respects.
130 Even when the company executive speaks from a carefully prepared text to a formal
gathering of security analysts, iresponses to questions thereafter will invariably involve the
sameidangers.of communication problems as in an informal interview. See Marx v. Computer
Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974).
131 This type of selective disclosure would undoubtedly be viewed as nothing more than a
tip and thus is not advisable in any event. Dayan, supra note 95, at 944.
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interviews may not be uncommon, perhaps there can be no true "off
the record" discussion between management and security analysts.
In view of the business of analysts, who evaluate securities on the
basis of all available information and share their evaluation with cus-
tomers and clients in the form of buy and sell recommendations, it is,
perhaps, unreasonable to assume that they will treat as truly confi-
dential any material information revealed to them. In any event,
when an error is clearly traceable to the issuer and the attribution
link is drawn thereby, the issuer is in part at fault for the public
dissemination of the inaccuracy and, therefore, has a duty to correct,
regardless of its subjective desire to avoid publicity.
B. When the Source of the Rumor Is Unknown
Another instance in which the attribution question arises is
when the source of a rumor is unknown, so that it is impossible to
determine whether the rumor is attributable to the issuer.13 2 The
burden of proof on the attribution issue is then elevated to primary
significance. However, there seems to be no reason to shift the bur-
den from the party on whom it normally rests, the one seeking to
prove that a duty under the securities laws has been breached. The
issue of whether there is a duty to correct marketplace rumors was
squarely presented in State Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor Corp. 133 In
that case, the defendant-issuer refrained from comment on rampant.
rumors which caused the price and volume of the stock to rise rap-
idly. The company had been awarded a significant contract and was
132 However, a common scenario is that while the precise source of the rumor may be
undeterminable, the substance of the rumor may suggest that it could only have originated
with the issuer. For example, the rumors of a large contract in State Teachers Retirement Bd.
v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981), almost had to have been leaked out by the issuer,
which was the only party that knew of the agreement. While this likelihood may create a
legitimate question of fact concerning the source of the rumor, it should not relieve the plain-
tiff of his burden of proof on that issue. In other words, no presumptions concerning the
source of the rumors should be entertained simply because of their content. The reason, quite
clearly, is that no matter how apparently obvious the likely source, there are always other
possible explanations. For example, the rumor in Fluor might well have come from the South
African enterprise with whom Fluor contracted, even though such a disclosure might have
prejudiced their ongoing financing negotiations. The rumor could also have been planted by
an analyst fishing for a reason for the unusual activity in the company's stock and hoping to
prompt an issuer response.
Another example is the rumors of a rich strike in Texas GulfSulohur, which would seem to
have originated only from those in the know, i.e., the issuer or its employees. In fact, at least
some of the reports were simply speculation inferred from the fact that samples were flown to
the United States for chemical assay. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 844 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
133 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981).
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contractually bound to remain silent temporarily. As to whether the
company was obliged to speak in the face of the rumors, the court
first reiterated the rule that there is no duty to correct rumors unless
the rumors can be attributed to the issuer. It then concluded that
there could be no duty to correct because "[t]here is no evidence that
the rumors affecting the volume and price of Fluor stock can be at-
tributed to Fluor."' 134 The court found no need to shift the burden of
proof to the issuer on the question of attribution. Thus, when the
source of a rumor is truly unknown, the rumor should not be attrib-
uted to the issuer, and the issuer has no duty to correct it. 135
C. When the Issuer Is Not the Source of the Rumor
Having discussed the situations in which the issuer is the source
of the information or the source is unknown, the next step in the
continuum is where the issuer is demonstrably not the source of the
rumor or publicity. The fault analysis proposed in this article sug-
gests that rumors or publicity generated by others need not be cor-
rected by the issuer because the issuer bore no responsibility for
dissemination and, thus, the rumors or publicity are not "attributa-
ble" to the issuer. While that is the correct conclusion, its generality
may be deceiving. The issuer may share responsibility for the dissem-
ination of inaccuracies, and thereby have a duty to speak, even
though it was not the initial source. For example, if an analyst's re-
search report concerning the issuer, prepared independently of the
issuer, is distributed by the issuer to its shareholders, does not the
issuer share responsibility even though it is not the original source?
By distributing the report, the issuer has vouched for the accuracy of
the analysis and adopted it as its own. Such a report is, in a very real
sense, attributable to the issuer, and the issuer should be compelled
to correct any errors in the report. 136 Likewise, a specific confirma-
tion by the issuer of the facts and conclusions in a news report or
research analysis verifies its accuracy and is no different than if the
issuer had been the initial source. Again, this should create a duty on
the part of the issuer to correct any errors in the report or analysis.137
134 Id at 850.
135 Those commentators who argue for a broader obligation on the issuer in this context
have looked solely to the purpose of the securities laws. See, e.g., JACOBS, .rupra note 95, at
§ 89, pp. 4-20 to 4-21, and authorities cited therein.
136 See Fleischer, Regulation, 1972 SEc. L. REv. 105, 109 [hereinafter cited as Fleischer,
Regulation]; Fleischer, supra note 82, at 134.
137 See, e.g., Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 446 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), afd, 442
F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1970); BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS, supra note 14, § 88.04[b], at 4-18. In
Green v. Jonhop, 358 F. Supp. 413, 420 (D. Ore. 1973), the executive vice-president of the
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The same reasoning should apply when the issuer's ratification
of the report is not so straightforward but can be implied from con-
duct. 138 In such situations, difficult fact questions will arise as to
whether the issuer's conduct constitutes an implied adoption or con-
firmation of the report. For example, if unreasonably optimistic re-
ports or projections are presented in the presence of company officials
who offer no dissent and who speak in optimistic terms which en-
courage reliance on the report, the issuer may be held to have a duty
to correct the errors in the report. 39 The more common occurrence
is when the issuer consents to review an analyst's market letter for
errors in advance of publication. I4° It may well be that by such in-
volvement the issuer will be deemed to have verified the accuracy of
the matter stated in the market letter. If so, the issuer clearly has a
duty to correct its owi, verification, just as it would have a duty to
correct any of its own erroneous statements.
Whether the issuer created such a duty by conduct was at issue
in Elkind v. Liggett &Myers, Inc. 141 In that case, the issuer, Liggett &
Myers, decided that its stock was undervalued by the market and to
help cure this problem instituted an "analyst program" which in-
cluded promoting closer contact between security analysts and com-
pany management. 42 As part of the program, the issuer regularly
issuer confirmed analysts' earnings projections to a broker who relayed the confirmation to a
prospective buyer. The court, however, was not called upon to determine whether the confir-
mation'created a duty'to correct the projection because numerous other facts rendered the
issuer's silence actionable.
138 Confirmation by the issuer of a report prepared by another, resulting in a duty to
correct, can be express or implied. BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS, supra note 14, at 138.461.
139 Green v. Jonhop, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ore. 1973). Based on these facts, and
apparently the additional fact that the erroneous analysis originated with the issuer's under-
writer, the issuer was held to have aided and abetted the analyst's violation of the act and, in
addition, to have breached a duty to correct the publicized misstatements. It was not entirely
clear from the opinion whether the special relationship between the analyst and the issuer was
essential to the conclusion that the issuer's actions created a duty to correct. This decision is
discussed in greater detail in notes 150-55 and accompanying text incfa.
140 Although undoubtedly less common, the issuer might also be given the opportunity to
review news reports in advance. See, for example, SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 279
F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), in which a reporter for the Wall Street Journal permitted a
company official to review a draft of his article based on an earlier interview with the same
official. According to Jensen, Business and the Press, in CORPORATIONS AND THEIR CRITIcs,
(D. Vogel & T. Bradshaw ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Jensen], news reports in the financial
press "often have been cleared, word for word, by the publicatons in advance." Id at 52.
Advance reviews of news reports and market letters involve the same considerations.
141 472 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affdin part, rev'dinpart, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
The facts of this case recited herein are taken from both opinions.
142 The issuer's argument that it did not have a duty to correct faulty earnings projections
by analysts was not helped by the manner in which it went out of its way to cultivate analyst
interest. This fact did not appear to have any significant effect on the ultimate outcome,
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reviewed analysts' market letters prior to publication to correct errors
and other misunderstandings. The issue of a duty to correct was
raised because several analysts had published favorable reports con-
cerning the issuer containing projections of an earnings increase of
approximately ten percent over the previous year. Management was
considerably less optimistic and the issuer's internal budget projec-
tions predicted only a two percent profit increase. The issuer main-
tained that its policy was only to correct factual errors and not to
comment upon incorrect opinions or projections based on correct fac-
tual information. Pursuant to the company's policy, it reviewed the
reports in advance, correcting factual errors where necessary, but did
not comment (or make evasive or noncommittal remarks) on the
earnings projections. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit stated the issue as follows: "[T]he controversy before
us is whether Liggett sufficiently entangled itself with the analysts'
forecasts to render those predictions 'attributable to it,' thus remov-
ing it from the conduct held protected in Electronic Specialty.'14 3 The
court resolved the issue by affirming the trial court's decision that the
issuer had breached no legally imposed duty to correct the erroneous
projections. However, the court expressly recognized that such a
duty could arise from too close an association of the issuer with the
preparation of market letters:
We have no doubt that a company may so involve itself in the prep-
aration of reports and projections by outsiders as to assume a duty
to correct material errors in those projections. This may occur
when officials of the company have, by their activity, made an im-
plied representation that the information they have reviewed is true
or at least in accordance with the company's view. 144
Nevertheless, stressing that the company's policy was not to comment
on earnings forecasts, that the analysts knew they were not being
made privy to the company's internal projections and that the com-
pany did not fail to correct any purely factual errors, 45 the Second
however, perhaps because the issuer's "analyst program," although more blatant, was proba-
bly not significantly different from the approach of most publicly held issuers toward security
analysts.
143 635 F.2d at 163.
144 Id
145 Variations in any of these facts may distiriguish future cases. For example, if the issuer
has no policy that pre-release review of market letters is to be limited to factual matters, or if
that policy is not well documented, even a limited review of the facts may create a duty to
correct earnings projections. Such a review might create an inference that the review covered
everything. Indeed, there is a suggestion in Elkind that it is common for issuers to review
analysts' earnings projections as well as factual recitations. 472 F. Supp. at 126. Likewise, if
the corporate policy of limited factual review is not known to analysts the same inference of
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Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding of fact that no representa-
tion of verification was made by the company's advance review of the
market letters. 4 6
The true significance of this decision could be lost if the precise
holding is not understood. Certainly, it reaffirms Electronic Specialy
and the attribution principle. And, while interpreting "attributable"
to include issuer involvement with information from an independent
source, it confines the issuer's duty to those instances where its own
actions render the issuer partly responsible for the inaccurate dissem-
ination. 47 However, the decision does not necessarily stand for the
proposition that by reviewing only the facts, the issuer need not be
concerned with an obligation to correct erroneous earnings forecasts
or other interpretive matter published in market letters or elsewhere.
Although that specific result prevailed as to the issuer in Elkind, the
court's holding was a limited one, i.e., that the lower court's resolu-
tion of this fact question was not clearly erroneous. Consequently,
essentially the same facts, if presented again, could result in a differ-
ent outcome without inconsistency with the Second Circuit's decision
in Elkind. Indeed, the court's opinion suggests some displeasure with
complete review could be drawn from any advance review, regardless of how limited. Of
course, a limited review will create a duty to correct any subsequently discovered inaccuracy
in the factual material reported in the market letter.
146 635 F.2d at 163. Whether the lower court made any such finding of fact is not entirely
clear. Applying the Electronic Specialty standard, the lower court held simply that, "[t]he
plaintiff has not stated a cause of action against Liggett for failure to correct speculation
about its earnings." 472 F. Supp. at 126. Perhaps the failure to state a claim resulted, as the
appellate court suggests, from inability to infer verification of the projections from the issuer's
review of the facts contained in market letters. Equally plausible, however, is that the lower
court determined that even if such an inference could be drawn, the erroneous projection
would still not be "attributable" to the issuer. In other words, the lower court might not have
made any finding of fact but simply interpreted the Electronic Specially standard of attribution
very narrowly.
147 This conclusion is drawn from the result reached in the case. If the issuer could be
liable for failure to correct where it simply remained silent and did nothing, the entire inquiry
concerning whether the issuer, by its actions, "entangled itself" with the forecast would have
been unnecessary.
Also implicit in this result is the rejection of the theory that the issuer is obligated to
correct publicity simply because the proximity of the independent source to the issuer lends
greater credence to the publicity. See notes 150-55 and accompanying text infa. The public
is unlikely, or at least less likely than analysts, to appreciate the distinction between review of
facts and review of opinions. Thus, if the public knows that the issuer has reviewed the report
in advance it may think that the entire market letter, including earnings projections, has been
confirmed by the issuer even when the review was limited to facts. Such a conclusion by the
public is particularly reasonable if, as attested to by expert witnesses at the Elkind trial, it was
the custom and the practice in the industry to correct analysts' earnings projections which err
by a significant margin. 472 F. Supp. at 126. But see Bauman, supra note 24, at 971-72,
which reasons that investors should not conclude that a market letter represents the views of
the issuer simply because it is based on information supplied by the issuer.
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the outcome of the case. The opinion contains a warning that ad-
vance review of market letters is dangerous:
[I]t bears noting that corporate pre-release review of the reports of
analysts is a risky activity, fraught with danger. Management must
navigate carefully between the 'Scylla' of misleading stockholders
and the public by implied approval of reviewed analyses and the
'Charybdis' of tipping material inside information by correcting
statements which it knows to be erroneous. A company which un-
dertakes to correct errors in reports presented to it for review may
find itself forced to choose betweeen raising no objection to a state-
ment which, because it is contradicted by internal information,
may be misleading and making that information public at a time
when corporate interests would best be served by confidentiality.
Management thus risks sacrificing a measure of its autonomy by
engaging in this type of program.
1 48
Several definitive conclusions can be reached on the basis of the
Elkind decision. First, publicity can be attributable to the issuer
within the meaning of Electronic Specialty even if the issuer is not the
source, as long as the issuer, by its actions, implies that it confirms the
accuracy of the publicity. Second, although advance review of facts
will not necessarily imply issuer confirmation as to forecasts and
opinions contained in market letters, the issue remains a question of
fact. Consequently, the risks of creating a duty to correct all errors is
inherent in even limited advance review of market letters or news
reports. Normally, management reaction to such a risk would simply
be avoidance of all pre-release review of market letters, even review
limited to facts. That reaction, in turn, would lead to distribution of
more inaccurate information to the investing public, rather than less.
Other forces, however, will probably combine to avert such normal
expectations. For instance, the issuer's desire to promote public in-
terest in its securities by promoting the interest of analysts, and trad-
ing by the issuer and/or its insiders in the issuer's securities (which
could not legally take place if the issuer remains silent concerning
material publicized inaccuracies) should prompt continuation of ad-
vance review of factual matters discussed in market letters, despite
the risks involved.
149
Another situation concerning the issuer's duty to correct occurs
148 635 F.2d at 163-64. The corhmentators have also. cautioned against any advance re-
view of market letters beyond their purely factual statements, and even then have warned of
danger. Fleischer, supra note 82, at 134; Flom & Atkins, sufira note 36, at 117.
149 That issuer review of analysts' market letters involves some risk is obviously not a new
discovery. See, for example, the authorities cited in note 148, supra in which the risks were
discussed in 1967 and 1974 publications. The fact that such review has not been curtailed in
the past is itself persuasive that reviews will continue.
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when the publicity emanates not from the issuer but from some in-
dependent source which has a special relationship with the issuer.
This situation was first addressed in Green v. Jonhop, Inc. ,150 in which
an investment firm, acting as the underwriter and a market maker in
the issuer's securities, distributed a market letter containing un-
founded earnings estimates, an unrealistically optimistic discussion of
the issuer's operations and future plans, and a recommendation to
buy the issuer's securities. Although the issuer was fully aware that
the market letter's conclusions were unsubstantiated, it chose to re-
main silent. The investment firm had also issued a "special situation
report" which was similarly misleading. With respect to this report,
the president of the issuer made a private protest to the investment
firm, but the executive vice president attended sales meetings at
which the report was discussed and, not only did not refute the re-
port, but also spoke in optimistic terms, thereby lending credence to
the projections in the report. At one point, the vice president of the
issuer even confirmed the earnings projections in a conversation with
a broker. Based upon these facts, the court held that the issuer had a
duty to take some action to stop the deception of the public caused
by the market letters.' 51 The court stressed that public reliance on
150 358 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ore. 1973).
151 Id at 420. Whether the court held there was a primary duty to speak out or only that
the issuer was secondarily liable is not entirely clear from the opinion. Initially the court held
that the issuer's silence and related conduct were actionable because public reliance on the
market letter was encouraged thereby and, therefore, that the issuer was liable under an aid-
ing and abetting theory. Id. at 419, 420. In a subsequent section of the opinion, the court
spoke of the duty to correct in terms which suggested primary rather than secondary
responsibility:
A corporation cannot be held responsible for all omissions or misrepresenta-
tions made about its financial condition and future prospects by every broker-
dealer or securities salesman. It is only obligated to take some action when it learns
ofsuch misstatements or omissions and is aware that their publication or nonpubli-
cation will be misleading to members of the investing public.
Id. at 420. However, immediately thereafter the court suggested that it was holding the issuer
on an aiding and abetting or conspiracy theory: "Under the circumstances of this case, fail-
ure by [the issuer] or [its executive vice-president] to take appropriate action amounted to a
tacit agreement with [the investment firm] to encourage investors to buy and hold Jonhop
stock." Id.
A careful reading of the opinion, however, reveals that the court did not hold that a
special relationship alone creates a primary duty to correct. In considering the dealer's erro-
neous market letter, in connection with which the issuer took no affirmative steps which
might be viewed as confirming or adopting its conclusions, the court held:
Jones' and Jonhop's silence and inaction encouraged reliance by the public on
the misrepresentations and omissions in the comment, since it was well known that
American Western was the underwriter and principal dealer in Jonhop stock. Such
acquiescence through silence is a form of aiding andabetting cognizable under § 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5.
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the market letter was encouraged because it was well known that the
investment firm was the underwriter and principal dealer in the is-
suer's stock.
The result in Jonhop has led some commentators to conclude
that errors published by someone in a "special relationship" with the
issuer may create a duty for the issuer to correct the errors. 52 The
rationale is that because of the special relationship, the public will be
led to believe that the publisher of the report has access to the issuer's
information and, therefore, that the report has more credibility than
one published by a stranger to the issuer. 5 3 Under this analysis, the
special relationships which might give rise to a duty to correct could
include almost any connection with the issuer which might suggest
that the publicity is based upon inside information. Thus, beyond
the underwriter and principal market maker involved inJonhop, such
a special relationship might be had by an independent accountant,
outside counsel, management consultant and, depending upon the
nature of the information which is the subject of the report, a cus-
tomer, supplier, distributor or almost anyone who has dealings with
the issuer.154 In fact, because the focus of the analysis is exclusively
on the perceived reliability of the publicity, the logical conclusion is
that a special relationship is not even necessary if, for some reason,
the report is particularly believable. Perhaps a report published by
an analyst who is an acknowledged expert in the issuer's industry
358 F. Supp. at 419 (emphasis added). The court's later discussion concerning primary rather
than secondary liability followed its consideration of, and appears to be dependent on, the
additional facts of actions by the issuer by which the issuer expressly and impliedly confirmed
the erroneous reports.
152 Bauman, supra note 24, at 940, 971-72; BROMBERG AND LOWENFELS, supra note 14, at
138.469; Fiflis, supra note 35, at 144; Peacock, supra note 82, at 904.
153 Bauman, supra note 24, at 940, 971-72; Fiffis, supra note 35, at 144; Peacock, supra note
82, at 904.
154 For example, if the report is that the issuer's production has been interrupted, that
report will take on greater credibility if a regular customer of the issuer is quoted as the
source.
In SEC v. Electrogen Indus., Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH)
§ 92, 156 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), the SEC sought to enjoin alleged lOb-5 violations based upon
misleading statements concerning the utility of the defendant-issuer's product, an anti-fatigue
device. Apparently many of the statements at issue were madeby the issuer's unaffiliated
distributor. However, because there were also such statements made by the issuer and its
officers, the court did not find it necessary to differentiate between statements from the two
sources when enjoining the issuer.
If reliability alone is the issue, it would be necessary to require the issuer to respond even
when the analyst-author "becomes associated with the issuer in the minds of the public
... " Fiflis, supra note 35, at 144. This suggests that a special relationship in fact is not.the
key, but rather that the issue will turn on whether the public thinks there is such a
relationship.
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may be considered so reliable that the issuer should have the duty to
correct the analyst's errors. 155 Carried to its logical extreme, the is-
suer should respond to all publicity which has a high degree of relia-
bility and, therefore, a strong capacity to deceive. As a practical
matter, however, this would translate into a very broad duty to cor-
rect and one which clearly exceeds the attribution principle.
The basic flaw in the reasoning that the issuer should respond to
statements made by those with the special relationship to the issuer is
its focus on the likelihood of deception rather than on whether the issuer
caused or contributed to the deception. That reasoning will produce lia-
bility on the silent issuer even when it is totally innocent and free
from any responsibility for the dissemination of the inaccuracy and
the resulting investor reliance. As indicated above, the decisions con-
cerning an issuer's duty to correct have never looked soe.1v to the capac-
ipy of the rumor or publicity to deceive. 156 In all those cases, the
information not only had a capacity to deceive, but, in fact, allegedly
did deceive the plaintiffs who bought or sold in reliance on it. Never-
theless, the courts limited the issuer's duty to respond to those situa-
tions where the issuer was in some way responsible for the
publication of the inaccuracy.
The fault analysis proposed in this article 157 submits that issuer
responsibility rather than investor deception triggers the duty to re-
spond. This approach is consistent with the decision inJonhop. In
that case, a primary duty to correct was imposed on the issuer only
after the company management spoke optimistically at the same
meeting in which the erroneous projections were discussed and even
155 The question of the issuer's duty to correct errors by an analyst who is an expert in the
issuer's industry is discussed in Bauman, supra note 24, at 972. Although Professor Bauman
seems to acknowledge that this line of reasoning would logically result in a duty to correct
such an expert's errors, he concludes that such a result would nevertheless be inappropriate.
156 See, e.g., State Teachers Retirement Board v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981);
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Electronic Specialty Co. v.
International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). Even Professor Bauman, who
argues vigorously for a broader duty than that advocated in this article, would excuse the
issuer who is completely free of fault. While concluding that issuers should respond to state-
ments by outsiders with a special relationship and by corporate officials whose positions lend
greater credence to their statements, Professor Bauman would nevertheless remove that duty
from the issuer "if it has established procedures to prevent such misstatements, and these
procedures are breached through no fault of the corporation." Bauman, supra note 24, at 940.
But his suggestion looks at issuer fault in a different way. The fault concept is not dependent
on affirmative action by the issuer, but looks solely to whether the issuer has in any way
caused or contributed to the dissemination of inaccuracies and resulting public deception.
The issuer should be absolved of fault even if it has not taken any affirmative steps to avoid
misstatements by outsiders.
157 See notes 109-15 and accompanying text sura.
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confirmed the projections to a broker. Those facts indicate a degree
of issuer culpability upon which even the fault analysis would find a
duty to correct. With respect to issuer silence in the face of inaccura-
cies published by one with a special relationship to the issuer, the
court concluded only that the issuer was liable as an aider or
abettor.
5 8
Although a duty to correct should not result simply from a spe-
cial relationship, such a relationship is not irrelevant in determining
whether such a duty exists. It may be significant in ascertaining
whether the issuer has any responsibility for the public dissemina-
tion. On the facts ofJonhop, for example, if an officer of the issuer
speaks optimistically from a podium shared with an analyst who has
reported erroneously high earnings projections, it might be inferred
that the issuer has confirmed the analyst's projections where a special
relationship exists between the issuer and the analyst. In the absence
of such a relationship, the case for issuer confirmation is less persua-
sive. But even in such a situation, the inference results from the is-
suer's own actions, not from the relationship alone.
The last stop in the continuum is when the issuer is demon-
strably not the source of the information, but either it or one of its
officers is cited as the source in the report. The erroneous reference
to the issuer may result from inadvertence or it may be intentional. 159
Regardless of the reporter's motive, the result is publicity which, on
its face, is attributable to the issuer. It has been suggested that, in
this event, the issuer has a duty to respond, 60 probably because the
association of the article with the issuer will render the report more
believable. As indicated earlier, the fact that the report will be more
158 358 F. Supp. at 319. See note 151 supra.
159 It is probably more common for there to have simply been a breakdown in communi-
cation, where the issuer misspoke or the reporter or analyst misunderstood. In that situation,
whether the issuer is the source is simply a matter of proof. See notes 129 and 130 and accom-
panying text supra.
160 For example, JACOBS, supra note 95, at § 88.04[b], states:
If a statement made by an outsider is wrongfully attributed to the corporation, the
company's obligation to correct should be less stringent than when its own state-
ment became inaccurate, but more severe than situations in which the prior asser-
tion was made by and attributed to a third party.
Similarly, the attribution of someone else's statement to the issuer has been listed as one of the
variables to be considered in deciding whether the issuer is obligated to speak up. BROMBERG
& LOWENFELS, sura note 14, at 138.469. See also Milberg v. Western Pac. RR. Co., 51
F.R.D. 280, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), where the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the
issuer should be liable simply because its earnings did not match the optimistic prediction
found in a financial publication. The court did point out, however, that the report "did not
purport to quote" the issuer, thereby suggesting that the result may have changed had that
fact been different.
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credible should not be sufficient to impose a duty to correct unless
there is evidence of issuer responsibility or fault.' 6' Although such a
report is literally attributable to the issuer, the Electronic Specialt
standard should not be applied because it would allow others to force
disclosure by the issuer by planting a false rumor or news story and
simply adding, "according to the issuer."
VII. Conclusion
There will be many times when an issuer has no option about
whether to publicly correct or clarify a rumor or other publicity.
When the company is trading in its own securities, when it is making
other contemporaneous disclosures which would be rendered mis-
leading by the omission of a response, or when it is subject to the
timely disclosure policies of the self-regulatory organizations, the is-
suer must make an appropriate response to material publicity.
Otherwise, there is no affirmative disclosure obligation. Whether the
issuer is legally obligated to disclose will turn on whether the rumor
or report is "attributable" to it. As proposed in this article "attribu-
table". should be interpreted to refer only to situations when the is-
suer is at least partially responsible for the dissemination of the
publicity.
The result is that many issuers will have broad and, at least,
temporary discretion in deciding whether to answer or clarify public-
ity. In the exercise of that discretion they may decide that the law in
this area, especially as applied to the particular circumstances they
face, is simply too uncertain to risk silence.' 62 Or they may feel a
moral, if not legal, obligation to issue a correcting response, so that
their shareholders, other investors and employees are not harmed by
the inaccurate or unconfirmed publicity. 63 Their motives may even
be so lofty as to protect the market from inefficiencies resulting from
informational imbalances,16 or so base as to simply protect their own
161 See notes 151-58 and accompanying text supra.
162 For example, whether a court will accept the fault approach to the attribution issue
and how it might resolve the fact questions inherent in deciding whether the issuer was in any
way responsible for the publicity may be sufficiently uncertain to lead the cautious issuer to
conclude that the risk of liability from silence is simply too great. The other side of this coin,
of course, is the risk of material errors or omissions or misleading phraseology in the response,
which might also result in liability. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 867 (2d
Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
163 Clausen, Voluntaqy Disclosure: An Idea Whose Tie Has Come, in CORPORATIONS AND
THEIR CRrIcs 61 (1981); Dayan, Correcting Errors in the Press, 5 REV. OF SEc. REG. 941, 945
(1972).
164 See generaly Clausen, supra note 163.
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interests when threatened by unfavorable publicity.1 6 5 Whatever
their motives, in order that they might pursue their primary objec-
tive of profit for their shareholders most effectively, it is important
that issuers' discretion not be unreasonably restricted. The fault
analysis suggested in this article allows management the broadest lat-
itude in dealing with rumors and publicity, while simultaneously
protecting the public from attempts by the issuer to manipulate the
market through the dissemination of publicity.
165 An issuer response to a rumor is made more likely if the rumor is adverse, because it
will depress the price of its stock (and thus the value of the management's holdings) and
perhaps impede the issuer's immediate business objectives. A favorable rumor, on the other
hand, because of its tendency to enhance rather than injure the issuer, is less likely to be
answered. Jensen, mu/pra note 140, at 51; R. STEVENSON, CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION
87-88 (1980); Comment on Liability Under Rule lOb-5, sufira note 46, at 169-70.
